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ABSTRACT
The rationale for designing, implementing and managing
security technologies has a notion of “risk” at its core; the
risk of compromise to technology or information weighed
up against the cost of protecting against such an incursion.
However, such approaches have been focused on the protec-
tion of technology and information, with the assumption
that if this is protected then people are also protected; an
assumption that is much harder to maintain in a more open,
networked context such as the one that has been enabled
by growth of the World Wide Web. Grounded in the inter-
disciplinary endeavours that characterise Web Science, this
monograph presents the case for a more inclusive form of
technological security. Such a security places the security
of technology in the context of the security of people oper-
ating in a web-enabled and digitally-connected society and
results in a digital security that responds to the enmeshed
nature of technology and society. This monograph uses a
wide analytical lens that encompasses the sociotechnical
infrastructures, networks of power and the practices that
shape our interactions with and through digital technologies
to explore this more expansive form of security.
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Introduction
Digital technologies are woven across our everyday lives
As we become increasingly dependent on digital products in all aspects
of our lives, the reliability of that technology increases in importance.
Technological security mechanisms, such as passwords and data encryp-
tion, are a key way to ensure reliability in the technological delivery
by ensuring that the technology performs as expected. Technological
security can be thought of as the control of access to technical systems
and the control of the use of those systems.
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However, the way that digital technologies are woven across the
fabric of our everyday lives, and are embedded in all our institutions,
means that we need a paradigm for understanding technological security
as being part of other forms of security. This monograph introduces the
paradigm of digital security that not only encompasses the protection
of digital technologies and the data it produces, but also the practices
and processes that link those technologies. It also encompasses the
political and social processes and practices that shape the meanings,
and experiences of the digital protection mechanisms. In a digitally
mediated society, security of the state, of society, of individuals and of
technologies are bound together through these processes and practices,
giving new security meanings to security technologies and policies.
The political dimensions of security technologies are addressed in
cybersecurity scholarship. The study of cybersecurity examines techno-
logical security as it intersects with national or global interests (Carr
and Lesniewska, 2020). Cybersecurity is primarily understood from
the perspective of the state (Carr, 2016; Stevens, 2013), global human
rights (Carr, 2013; Deibert, 2018) and global governance (Carr, 2015).
There is also an acknowledgement that security has a moral force (Nis-
senbaum, 2005) and that security technology is political, but there have
been few studies that examine how people respond to cybersecurity
programmes and to the use of security technologies to regulate everyday
transactions and practices. Therefore, the term “digital security” is
introduced in this monograph to reference the security issues and re-
sponses that emerge at the intersections between technological security
and other forms of security, from the perspective of a person’s everyday
lived experience. Digital security connects technological security with
social and political issues that shape a person’s everyday security and
examines technological security in terms of the social impacts that it
has. Digital security is an inherently interdisciplinary study and practice
that focuses on technologies that predominantly rely on access to the
World Wide Web. This makes it a type of interdisciplinary study that
falls under the remit of Web Science.
Whilst the connection between technological security and social and
political forms of security in people’s everyday lives has been made
in reference to particular groups of technology users (Parkin et al.,
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2019; Strohmayer et al., 2017; Matthews et al., 2017) or in reference
to surveillance technologies (Gürses et al., 2016; Huysmans, 2011), the
connection is not made in the more mainstream security technology
studies or practices. This monograph seeks to address this gap and the
work presented shows why this perspective should be routinely included
in technological security analysis and design.
1.1 Background Research
This monograph distils a body of research and study that began with
the VOME project – Visualisation and Other Methods of Expres-
sion (VOME, 2010). This 3-year project started in 2007 and re-examined
how people use digital services and why they share what they share
on-line. In line with a Web Science research approach (Berners-Lee et al.,
2006, p.71), VOME acknowledged from the outset that the securing
of digital services and technology is embedded in a social setting. The
VOME project took an embodied position: wanting to understand how
people felt and experienced security when using digital technologies.
VOME’s core research question was: “What does privacy sound, feel
and look like?”. The project examined people’s attitudes towards in-
formational privacy in on-line settings, and we discovered that when
examined from an embodied perspective, the sharing and protection of
personal security on-line is experienced as a means of protecting the
individual, and their kin and friendship network. The VOME project
therefore strayed from traditional privacy studies, and instead focused
on the intersections between di erent types of security, and the security
feelings and responses that emerge at those intersections. From this
start point, subsequent projects examined how information sharing and
protection practices evoke feelings of security and how these feelings, in
turn, shape those practices.
The project committed to working with the creative arts in a human-
ities tradition, as well as drawing on the more traditional digital privacy
and usable security research to explore these embodied dimensions and
pursue this line of enquiry. In following an embodied line of enquiry,
the research revealed that how security technology was intended to
feel, look and work like was not the actual experience of many of the
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groups that the project worked with. This was because technological
security intersects with other forms of security, and these intersections
can engender an embodied sense of insecurity as well as security. For
example, if someone is financially insecure, then a complex process of
accessing financial services can exacerbate that feeling of insecurity,
making the access control processes seem hostile.
Technological security sits at the intersection with other forms of security
People are called upon to prove or verify who they are when setting up
a financial service account. This is often a process that requires multiple
sources of documentation, not always readily available to the individual
or that are costly for the individual to provide. This evidence might
be requested using language that can be di cult for the individual to
follow and the process might result in a negative outcome if not followed
precisely as set-out. For those already feeling insecure or lacking in
confidence, the identity verification process can be anxiety-inducing,
and result in that individual asking for informal help from their kin
and friendship network. This help might be constructive but also might
increase the vulnerability of the individual.
Similarly, if someone is feeling anxious and uncertain about their
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health, remote access to a health system that is complex and impersonal
can amplify those feelings of health insecurity. This can lead to either
avoidance of the health service or the altering of data submitted to
the health system. Both of these information sharing practices can
result in increasing the vulnerability of the individual. The anxiety
a person experiences with digital health services can be amplified by
limited access to digital connectivity and to data. This can result in an
individual having to borrow a device from a family member or friend, or
can result in an individual having to rely on someone else to upload their
records. Both courses of action can increase an individual’s anxiety and
extend their vulnerabilities to information misuse or denial of access. If
healthcare is not free at the point of access, financial worries can also
increase the stress of this situation. The research concluded that security
technology often felt alienating, confusing and either threatening or
useless to many people. Those negative feelings thus shaped how people
used such technology and, in particular, the ways in which they shared
and protected information.
Taking an embodied position to examine security aspects of human
computer interaction was an unusual starting point for research in
this area. The more typical position was to examine the topic from an
objective, external perspective, using a positivist research paradigm to
focus on the security functionality of the digital technology, and the
security of the digital interaction.
An embodied position also revealed a wider view of security in digi-
tal settings; it revealed that the security practices people undertake in
a digital setting are not limited to the interaction with the technology,
but are set in the context of wider interactions with people within their
kin and friendship networks. For example, Light and Coles-Kemp (2013)
showed that in family settings grandmothers with little or no digital
expertise can play a significant role in the information sharing and
protection practices of their digitally-confident granddaughters. The
study with grandmothers and granddaughters challenged the notion
that information sharing and protection practices relevant to digital in-
teraction only take place within the interaction itself. The study showed
that the information sharing and protection that takes place around
the digital interaction can have a significant e ect on the information
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
1.1. Background Research 7
sharing and protection that takes place within the interaction. The
study also showed that working through a social proxy (somebody
who carries out information sharing and protection actions on behalf
of another person) can engender feelings of confidence in information
sharing and protection practices, as well as encourage critical reflection
on those practices within the digital interaction itself.
In the finance, health and family examples above, the traditional
focus on the security design of the technology, and the focus on the
information sharing and protection within the digital interaction, have
meant that exploring the significance of what happens in the space
around the digital interaction has been ignored. At the same time, the
traditional approach has also not taken into account the ways in which
technological security intersects with other forms of security, and how
an individual responds to those intersections. Finally, the traditional ap-
proach has not examined how the political, social and economic context
in which people use technologies shapes the meanings of technological
controls. As a result, opportunities for security interventions in those
wider spaces have been lost, and the conditions for e ective use of
technological security have not been created. Based on our research, we
argue that studying the information sharing and protection practices in
the space around the digital interaction, brings to the fore the political,
social and economic meanings of technological controls. We also argue
that the embodied position from which these practices emerge must
also be understood if technological security controls are to be e ective
and the value of the expertise in creating such technologies is to be
realised.
The VOME research therefore identified a number of blind spots
within the traditional ways that we understand technological security:
• Security issues in digitally-mediated interactions are not consid-
ered from the perspective of those using the technologies. Instead
they are typically considered from the perspective of the experts
designing and implementing the relevant technologies and conse-
quently often address issues that are only partially relevant to the
users of those technologies.
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• Security practices are not understood in the wider context of
the social, political and economic complexities within which the
interactions take place. Consequently, practices are dismissed as
non-compliant when they are, in fact, responding to a di erent
security imperative.
• The potential for technologies and services to harm their users,
both intentionally and unintentionally, is not considered as part
of the security analysis of a digital product, and yet the potential
for harm shapes people’s digital practices and experiences.
The research further shone a light on the importance of understanding
how technological security intersects with other forms of security, and
the responses that emerge at those intersections. VOME research yielded
three core insights that illuminate these intersections:
• Assessing risk to digitally-mediated networked interactions re-
quires both the assessment of risks to technology, and of the risks
networked technology use pose to the users of that technology;
• The understanding of technological risk needs to be set in the
context of the wider concerns that networked technology users
are experiencing;
• People often focus on the benefits that they gain from using a
technology or service, and consider the technological security risks
in relation to that benefit.
The VOME research showed that it is important to understand techno-
logical security both in relation to the protection of technology and of
people so that we can better understand where:
• Security technologies create threats to human computer interac-
tion; and
• Interventions and responses might be made in the spaces around
the human computer interaction.
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The research has been recognised by the UK’s Cyber Security Body of
Knowledge (CyBOK, 2019a) as a new area in Cybersecurity Human
Factors (CyBOK, 2019b). The practice has also been recognised as
part of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre guidance on people-
centred security (NCSC, 2019). The guidance titled You Shape Security
is primarily written for security practitioners: from those who design
approaches to technological security within organisations, to those who
deploy and manage those approaches.
1.2 Adoption and Development
Following on from VOME, five further projects formed a programme
of work grounded on the following position: for technological security
to be e ective, a broader digital security must be designed that supports
people to both realise the benefits of a digital service and to realise those
benefits safely.
Mapping out a broader digital security
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The programme of work has focused on the following research aspira-
tions:
• Alternative paradigms of technological security: using the so-
cial and political theories of security for inspiration, alternative
paradigms for technological security have been investigated and
developed.
• Participatory design and practice for technological security: using
the principles of participatory design and arts-based research
practice, methods that generate a wider lens for understanding
people-centrred security have been developed and practiced.
• Inclusion as a form of security: drawing on thinking and practices
related to a conceptualisation of security as a form of empowerment
and enablement (and as a collective rather than individualistic is-
sue), digital security structures and practices have been developed
using ideas that focus on trust, resilience and collaboration.
The programme of research has developed an inclusive position on digital
security that foregrounds benefits for people, and places technological
risk in relation to those benefits. The programme of research was
further developed through the a UK Research Council funded fellowship,
Everyday Safety-Security for Essential Services (ESSfES), and a UK
Research Council funded research network that co-ordinates research in
social justice in the digital economy (Not-Equal). This network includes
a focus on inclusive digital security research under the theme of “Digital
Security For All”.
1.3 Structure of this Monograph
The monograph starts with a sketch of the main schools of security
theory that set out the broader social and political conceptualisations of
security into which technological security is deployed. The monograph
then briefly sketches technological security and its position on the
protection of people, before placing technological security in the wider
security theory landscape.
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These first three chapters reveal the limitations of traditional security
thinking when examining technology use in a digitally-mediated society.
In particular, the three chapters show how on the one hand digital
technology creates spaces in which people can be empowered to create
and shape opportunities, but on the other hand does not provide a
means with which to respond to many of the security issues that emerge
as a result of that creativity. The next three chapters present a possible
way forward in the form of a digital security paradigm that draws on
the trust-led, relational, issues-focused work of digital civics, and the
broad range of ontological positions from security theory, in order to
respond to these limitations.
As a reference, this monograph has the remaining chapters:
• Security Theory Building Blocks
chapter 2: maps out the main schools of thought in political
and social theories of security, and reflects on their relevance to
technological security.
• Technological Security and Its Users
chapter 3: maps the history of technological security with respect
to understanding its intersections with other forms of security.
• Connecting Technological Security and Security Theory
chapter 4: examines how security theory and technological security
can be brought further into conversation.
• Digital Civics, A Practice-Lens and Digital Security
chapter 5: introduces a wider lens on human-computer interaction
and introduces the notion of practice.
• Digital Security: Practice and Methods
chapter 6: sets out possible approaches to practising and research-
ing digital security.
• Digital Security From Research to Application
chapter 7: sets out three worked examples of digital security and
presents key digital security principles.
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• Conclusions and Call to Action
chapter 8: summarises the arguments set out in the monograph
and issues a call to action.
The intended audience for this monograph is those studying and re-
searching digital design and interaction. The monograph introduces the
reader to alternative ways of conceptualising digital technology security.
The call to action is to bring together diverse communities of scholarship
to develop ideas of inclusive digital security as part of a wider move to
build a society that is secure for all.
1.4 Concluding Comments
Setting out on a journey into the security theory landscape
This introduction has set out the case for considering technological
security from two positions: from the position of protecting data and
technology, and from the position of protecting people in a digitally-
mediated society. When considering the latter, we are not solely consid-
ering technological security, but where technological security intersects
with both other securities and with an individual’s embodied sense of
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security and insecurity. To denote this wider position, the term “digital
security” is being applied to this intersectional form of technological
security.
In the next chapter we explore political and social theories of security
to set the scene for a wider conversation about digital security, and
to provide conceptualisations that might help us to better understand
some of these intersections outlined in this introductory chapter.
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Security Theory Building Blocks
From the VOME project onwards (UKRI, 2020), we discovered that
what we understood as technological security was part of a much wider
security landscape. We learned that people’s information sharing and
protection practices were shaped not only by their digital interactions,
but also by wider issues relating to people, state and organisational
security. We learned that in order to understand the e ectiveness of
technological security from the perspective of people and institutions,
we needed methods and conceptual frameworks that could help us to
identify and analyse the intersections of technological security with other
forms of security. Repeatedly our studies showed that an individual
experienced technological security in the context of economic security,
personal security, job security and emotional security. Through our
analysis, it became clear that technological security controls can amplify
or attenuate issues and concerns in those other areas of security, which
in turn increase or decrease an individual’s sense of security. We learned
that this was, in part, because not only do security technologies protect
data and technology, but they also signify the security position and
values of the institutions providing the technologies and services.
To understand more about these di erent security positions and to
14
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see what we could learn from the di erent schools of social and political
theories of security, we began to map the concept of security in the
classical canon of security thought (RISCS, 2018). Therefore, rather
than start with the fundamental principles of technological security,
this monograph starts with a broader overview of security, to better
understand security in its di erent forms.
Security technologists rarely focus
on other forms of security
This chapter is written with
technologists and students of so-
ciotechnical security in mind. It is
written to highlight that there is
a wider canon of security thought
than technologists are typically
taught, and to introduce some secu-
rity concepts that are not typically
presented in discussions about tech-
nological security. It is important to
understand that the security posi-
tions set out in this canon of security thought can be related to moments
in history that have resulted in particular ways of conceptualising vul-
nerability, strength, values and order. These moments have shaped the
values that are prioritised and the trade-o s that are deemed necessary
to maintain or restore order and stability.
The security theory literature shows that security is rarely considered
as an abstract concept (Smith, 2005; Baldwin, 1997), but often explained
in terms of how security is achieved or practised. The social and political
theories of security set out di ering ways of achieving and practising
security, and foreground di erent sites or focus for protection - for
example, in the security of states, people and society, as well as the
security of the environment, and of digital technology and services. The
literature also shows that regardless of the focus, security is also a
contested concept (Wolfers, 1952; Baldwin, 1997; Smith, 2005) where
di erent groups privilege di erent values for protection. Smith (2005)
argued that security itself is not a value, but is the protection of a
partially ordered set of values. This simply means that di erent ways of
seeing the world have di erent prioritisations of values. Each position
on security foregrounds a di erent value order for protection.
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Di erent groups privilege di erent
values
As a result, security is also a
concept that means di erent things
in di erent contexts (Smith, 2005),
and yet, despite these di erences,
most forms of security have at their
core the twin concepts of power and
order. For example, Thucydides, a
Greek General and historian, wrote
about power and war and in so do-
ing, about security. His works from
the 5th century BC present a partic-
ularly brutal form of security, one in
which strength is presented in terms
of the ability to survive and, there-
fore, the weak perish. Thucydides
could be interpreted as putting for-
ward a position on security where
internal order and military power
were needed for a secure state and therefore, by extension, a secure
people. This security position was taken up and appropriated by self-
described ‘realists’ in the 20th century.
The realist security perspective could perhaps be articulated as what-
ever an individual or a state cares about, or wants to do, they have
to survive first in order to be able to do that. The point is that such
a position prioritises what the state needs to do to survive. Security
therefore is seen as an a priori condition to the state attaining the other
conditions it might want.
When security is first explicitly theorised in the contemporary era,
it is done by elite individuals within state military and foreign policy
establishments (Wolfers, 1952; Lippmann et al., 1943). Their conception
of security is therefore concentrated on the state and its assets. Such
thinking orders values because it implicitly argues the security of the
state is preserved by enforcing buy-in to the values that the state
promotes, and agreement that as a result, other values will be sacrificed.
How the values and the order of those values is arrived at and the
means that states use to enforce those values, are political decisions.
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This type of security thinking is often described as reductionist as
only certain voices are empowered to state which values count and
security is reduced to a question of supporting the order of the values
or being against the order of the values. Security is thus conceptualised
in material terms because such security is primarily shaped by both
technologies of security and the territory that is to be protected.
From the 1980s onwards, the realist paradigm was challenged. For
example, liberal scholars challenged the privileging of the state in secu-
rity discussions (Kaldor, 2007). The concept of security was broadened
to consider other focus for protection, for example regional, economic,
human, societal and environmental security. Nevertheless the notion
of security retained the same basic conception of what security was.
Constructivist scholars (such as the Copenhagen school (Lipschutz,
1995)) argued that security was not in material form at all, but an
e ect of power generated through speech acts. By contrast, feminist
security scholars such as Hudson (2005) challenged the notion of the
state’s role in security, and looked to the security roles of the individual
and the collective (Doty, 1998). This shift in thinking also saw a move
to include the contemplation of security as a form of empowerment and
emancipation.
2.1 Navigating Security Scholarship
Security as protection from harms
Political and social theories of secu-
rity focus on a referent object: things
whose existence is threatened, and
which have a legitimate claim to sur-
vival (Buzan et al., 1998). In tradi-
tional thinking the referent object is
the state. Such theories also include
both the threat actor (someone or
something that can inflict damage
on a referent object), and the secu-
rity threat (an event or action that
can inflict damage on a referent object).
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
18 Security Theory Building Blocks
How these elements are mobilised depends on the worldview to
which the security theory is committed. This is sometimes referred to as
‘ontological commitment’ and can be determined from the responses to
a number of fundamental security questions. For example, Smith (2005)
set the following security questions:
• “Who or what needs to be secured?”
• “What is doing the securing?”
• “Why is the subject being secured?”
• “Who or what is the subject being secured from?”
This list was itself derived from David Baldwin’s wider set of ques-
tions (Baldwin, 1997):
• “Security for whom?”
• “Security for which values?”
• “How much security?”
• “For what threats?”
• “By what means?”
• “At what cost?”
• “In what time period?”
Baldwin’s list contrasts with Smith’s list by giving additional focus to
how security is done which means that some of the questions include the
notion of a trade-o  that often occurs when thinking about security as
a practice. The idea of a trade-o  makes clear that security is achieved
at the expense of something else. Baldwin’s list also gives less focus
to the underlying political reasoning. Instead, Baldwin focuses on the
choices that are being made regarding the security practice and the
responses to the threat. Such questions provide us with a means of
distinguishing between the di erent forms of security. The questions can
also be asked from multiple perspectives to determine the intersections
between di erent forms of security in a given situation.
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
2.2. Security Theory Landscape 19
Security and politics are entwined
The answers to these questions
reveal the value order that is being
protected by a particular security
position. Smith (2005) makes a dis-
tinction between security and secur-
ing. Securing is a term linked to the
state of being secure, or being safe.
It is achieved through an alignment
of values and agreement of goals and
objectives, as well as through pro-
tection of assets (Burdon and Coles-
Kemp, 2019). Securing does not al-
ways result in achieving the state of
being secure because for that state
to be achieved, securing has to suc-
cessfully result in su cient agree-
ment as to the values that are to be prioritised, and in what order, so
that the order is stable and uncontested.
Security is therefore the state of being secure, which Smith (2005)
argues is brought about through the attainment of political order.
Smith goes on to argue that security is simply a reflection of the relative
success or failure to secure. Analysing who or what is doing the securing
identifies the implicit social and political processes at work as well as
the economic incentives for complying with the political order.
2.2 Security Theory Landscape
Epistemologically, security theories are often placed on a positivist-
interpretivist continuum. On one end the realist and liberal theories
of security are positivist in the sense that they focus on how power
and control is exercised and what security does, not how security is
experienced. At the other end of the spectrum, interpretivist theories
of security focus on a wider set of security concerns than the protection
of the state. The interpretivist theories consider how state control and
protection is experienced.
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Balzacq (2010, p. 57) argues that “any approach to security starts
with, and rests upon, a specific ontological commitment”. In this context,
ontology is a particular view of what constitutes being, and what entities
constitute that being. Each ontological position privileges a particular
order of values. Balzacq (2010) argues that security theory can be
aligned with di erent types of ontology, and explains that “theories can
be committed to di erent kinds of ontology, but two broad categories
capture the range of possibilities on o er: materialism and idealism on
the one hand, and monism, dualism and pluralism, on the other”.
Many security technologies have
their roots in conflict
Balzacq (2010) explains that the-
ories typically sit within a combi-
nation of one from each category.
For example, whilst there are exam-
ples of materialism-monism (Whyte,
2018), the traditional state-centred
security theories are typically a com-
bination of materialism-dualism. Im-
plicit to realist security theories is
the assumption that some form of
conflict over security interests is in-
evitable. The ability to win conflict
and ensure the security of the state
is materialist, both because it is
shaped by access to military power
(forms of security technology) and
the expert knowledge regarding how
to win conflicts and its focus is on
the protection of territory.
In this example security is understood as dualist in the sense that
there is a gap between the real-world state of these conflicts and our
understanding and knowledge of them.
As we move along the positivism-interpretevism continuum, security
theories move more towards pluralism because multiple actors are
considered and therefore multiple views of the real-world and multiple
understandings of what it is to be secure are also considered. At the
same time, the focus of security is not to achieve a material form of
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security but the realisation of ideals, typically achieved with human
interaction (debate, negotiation and other forms of communication)
rather than material forms of security.
2.2.1 Security From Di erent Angles
Security theories o er di erent angles from which to look at security.
We might consider security in terms of a state attacking another state
or defending its borders. We might look at security in terms of the
relationship between the citizen and the state. We might see security as
interwoven relationships between institutions that protect and promote
a state’s interests. We might diversify what we see as the state’s interests
and consider, for example, environmental or societal security. We might
think of security as a political act. Security from these di erent angles
widens the analytical toolkit of those working with technological security.
Environmental security considers
human impacts on the planet
In the classical (Western) canon
of security thinking, ideas about se-
curity have often been born out of
conflict, as can be seen with the ear-
lier classical Greek example. These
theories focus on notions of military
strength, anticipate conflict, and re-
gard the amassing of power through
military strength (sometimes in con-
junction with political and strategic
alliances) as a means of winning a
conflict. For example, classical real-
ism has the following principles: ac-
cumulation of power; flawed nature
of humanity; and continuous struggle to increase their capabilities. Clas-
sical realism explains conflicting behaviour through human failings.
Wars are explained, for example, as resulting from the behaviours of
particular aggressive statesmen, or as a result of domestic political
systems that give greedy parochial groups the opportunity to pursue
self-serving expansionist foreign policies.
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A social contract sets out security
responsibilities
Gradually, over time, realist the-
ories became tempered by a focus on
security through law-regulated inter-
national relations. Whilst the state
is still foregrounded as the referent
object, collaboration, rule of law,
collectivity and trade relationships
are prioritised as the primary mech-
anisms of security. In this security
position, strength comes from mu-
tual interest and the maintenance
of relationships between states.
A secure relationship between the citizen and the state is often
implicit to a successful security strategy. One means of articulating the
relationship between the state and the people is through the concept
of a social contract, where the relationship between the individual and
the state is maintained. A social contract refers to an allocation of
security roles and responsibilities between the individual and the state,
whereby the individual is protected by the state, in return for obedience
and compliance. Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes are three European
philosophers from the 17th and 18th centuries who are often cited when
presenting ideas of social contract (albeit contrasting ones). Rousseau
believed that progressive civil society is primarily founded on property
and ownership, underwritten by a social contract. Locke believed that
all are free to do as they wish within the law of nature and of reason,
whilst Hobbes argued that people choose to enter a social contract,
giving up some of their liberties in order to enjoy peace. This thought
experiment is a test for the legitimisation of a state in fulfilling its
role as the entity that can guarantee social order, and for comparing
di erent types of states on that basis. These positions are universalist
in the sense that they are principles that are applied to all.
Security can also be understood in terms of institutional relationships
and political processes. The Copenhagen School (a school of academic
thought that emphasises non-military aspects of security) conceptualised
security as institutional values and norms where the site of security is
both the state and society. It put forward the idea that a framework
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for approaching the construction of security is based on ‘speech acts’
that designate particular issues or actors as existential threats. This
introduced the idea of ‘securitisation’, rhetoric that claims an ‘existential
threat’ to a particular referent object where this move is accepted by
a relevant audience. Security, in this sense, is a site of negotiation
between speakers and audiences, albeit one conditioned significantly by
the extent to which the speaker enjoys a position of authority within a
particular group (Lipschutz, 1995, p. 57).
Using the analytical device of sectors, securitisation theory shines
a light on security interactions that, whilst part of a state’s security,
foreground a more nuanced range of referent objects and reveal di erent
security strategies at work. Sectors are “seen as analytical devices
that are used to shed light on the diverse practices and dynamics of







These di erent sectors are used in security analysis to highlight the
di erent relationships at work that are used to secure the state. How-
ever, sectors are not distinct and remain part of a complex whole. The
Copenhagen School also developed the concept of desecuritisation. This
is the process whereby issues are recategorised from security to polit-
ical (Nyman, 2013). Securitising an issue elevates the status of that
issue so that it takes on an unchallengable position within the body
politic. A successfully securitised issue will attract more resource and is
potentially able to circumvent the typical rules and regulations. The
ability to move an issue from being regarded as an issue of security to
an issue of politics underscores how issues are socially constructed into
security issues that mobilise responses, and attract resources to support
those responses.
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2.2.2 Missing and Hidden Voices
Whilst the broadening of security issues by thinkers such as those within
the Copenhagen School made security thinking more relevant to a wider
range of stakeholders, there are still questions about the extent to which
stakeholders with lesser power or capabilities are represented. Security
scholar Hansen (2000) suggests that a tendency for security positions to
focus on ‘dominant voices’ contributes to further silencing those already
marginalised from security debates.
The protection of those stakeholders with less power and those less
able to be heard, are recognised through theories of human security
and feminist security studies. For example, human security is a concept
that identifies the security of human lives as the central objective of
national and international security policy (Doty, 1998). Theories of
human security contrast with, and grew out of increasing dissatisfaction
with, the state-centred concept of security. Human Security can play
five roles, namely: “to provide a shared language to highlight a new focus
in investigation; to guide evaluations; to guide positive analysis; to focus
attention in policy design; and to motivate action” (Fukuda-Parr and
Messineo, 2012, p. 15).
Human security examines the
rights to protection
Human security expands the
scope of security analysis and policy
in multiple directions: groups and
individuals, international systems,
institutions, politics, environment,
regions, publics, media, forces of na-
ture, and of market. Such a scope
also addresses notions of security
from a fundamental human rights perspective.
Feminist security theorists extend this position and challenge the
marginalisation of voices within society. Feminist security studies draw
on scholarship from many disciplines including anthropology, history,
literary theory, philosophy and sociology, as well as those trained in
peace research, security studies and technology (Wibben, 2010).
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Individual branches of feminist security studies form a broad coali-
tion that has four common characteristics (Wibben, 2010):
• Ask feminist research questions
• Base their research on women’s experiences
• Adopt a (self)-reflexive position
• Have an emancipatory agenda
A critical position challenges
dominant notions of strength
and power
In contrast to other forms of secu-
rity studies, feminist security stud-
ies deliberately include gender as
a central unit of analysis, where
gender is understood as a cate-
gory of analysis that is socially con-
structed (Wibben, 2010). For ex-
ample, feminist critical theorists ex-
amine prevailing assumptions about
both women and men: what it is
to be a man or a woman, what
is appropriately feminine or mascu-
line behaviour, the roles of women
and men within society, the work-
force, and the family (Whitworth,
1994, p. 24). This body of work
questions security from perspectives
that challenge the status quo. This
work includes the perspective of
marginalised men (Hooper, 2001; Connell, 2005) as well as the po-
sition of women. Feminist security studies therefore also debate the
power structures that shape feminist security studies. Feminist security
thinking is important to the study of security because it o ers both
critique and the invitation to imagine an alternative basis for a secure
world. On the one hand, feminist security theory critiques traditional
security positions, and challenges the legitimacy and the universality of
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these positions. On the other hand, feminist security theory can also
invite people to imagine alternative forms of security, and debate how
those forms of security might be enacted.
2.2.3 Security Logic
In practice, a security strategy is composed of several security logics
The purpose of security is in some form or other to protect an object or
group of objects from harm, and security theories represent di erent
ontological positions on which objects need to be protected and how.
The reasoning processes, together with the rhetorical moves, the forms
of evidence and the rationalities used to determine which objects to
privilege for protection, can be described as a logic. Doty (1998) char-
acterises these as security logic and argues that many security logics
are inextricably linked with the notion of territory. For example, some
families of security theory privilege the state as the primary object to
be secured, where state is defined as a form of territory. Other families
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of security theory privilege society as the group of objects to be secured,
but the understanding of society is still linked to the idea of territory.
A further grouping privileges the protection of people and through the
notion of identity is, often linked back to territory.
For example, Doty (1998) identifies three main security logics: na-
tional security logic, societal security logic and human security logic.
National security logic is a traditional, state-centred conception of secu-
rity. It is negative: security is perceived as the absence of an external
threat to the national/state territory. Societal security logic also has at
its heart the notion of self-other, and is typically linked to a notion of
territory, but foregrounds identity politics. Protection in this context is
therefore the ability of a society’s values and ways of living to continue
in spite of change or attack. Human security logic is a human and
individual-centred conception of security. It is a positive logic: security
perceived as a desired good which enables the pursuit and enjoyment of
a good life. It is a logic of inclusion, which transcends state boundaries
and binary conceptions of identity.
Accompanying the grouping of privileged objects in a security logic
is a power structure, and set of relationships, that enable the object
to be secured. An operational code of practice, which encompasses a
way of thinking about security, and a way of framing security, is used
to bolster the authority of a security logic.
There are other security groupings that one might consider. For ex-
ample, environmental and planetary security. Environmental security is
about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.
This looks, for example, at the impacts of overdevelopment, pollution,
ecology, water, population, conflict and war, and which proposes a
new theory of security on this basis. The United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (1972) initiated a discourse on planetary
security that has centred on “epistemic communities, social movements,
governmental departments, and international organisations” (Buzan
et al., 1998, p. 71).
Understanding the impact of a security logic requires analysis from
multiple perspectives. As Hudson et al. (2013) illustrates in a security
analysis of human tra cking, security issues are complex in that mul-
tiple perspectives are enmeshed within a security issue, and multiple
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theoretical positions are needed to both understand security and to
identify which security practices are needed in response. In this example,
the analysis reveals that taking a state-based analysis only sheds light on
one aspect of the power dynamic, but combining a state-based analysis
with a human-security analysis sheds further light on how people are
vulnerable to human tra cking.
Disrupting Traditional Security Logic
The way in which security is reasoned is related to what type of security
outcome is desired. Some of the families of security theory focus on the
protection of objects, whereas others focus on the freedoms gained if
threats are removed.
Security often has adversarial
connotations
Positive and Negative Secu-
rity: Negative security is the term
used when describing the security
reasoning that is used to protect ob-
jects. Negative security is an inward-
looking force focused on protec-
tion and maintaining the status-quo.
Negative security is a logic of bina-
ries (Doty, 1998), such as the bi-
nary of challenge-resistance or the
binary of inside-outside, authorised-
unauthorised. This is a reasoning
that Hoogensen and Rottem (2004,
p. 155) describe as “attack, parry
and riposte”.
Protective security reasoning often has a negative connotation. For
example, security is defined by Gjørv (2012, p. 836) as “relat[ing] to the
treatment of security as a concept we wish to avoid, one that should be
invoked as little as possible. We value it negatively, or it is understood to
represent a negative value”. As realist thinking shows us, security is not
always about protection; security can be o ensive as well as defensive.
Even in its defensive form, security can be done in such a way that it
is experienced as mean or pernicious. This is because security can be
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seen as a series of trade-o s, where security for some is achieved at the
expense of insecurity of others. This might also be because the security
goals are driven not only by a desire to protect but also a desire to
weaken or harm the opponent.
By contrast, positive security is an outward-looking force that is
progressive and enables people to move forward and develop their lives.
Positive security is “something that is positively valued, or as something
that is good or desired. It is a good which provides the foundation to
allow us to pursue our needs and interests and enjoy a full life” (Gjørv,
2012, p. 836). Positive security brings to light the notion of security as
enabler. It provides a language through which to think about the human
condition and human contribution to security. Roe (2008) highlights
the interplay between negative and positive forms of security, and how
security strategies are often a combination of both types of security.
Security practices take many
di erent forms
Universal Principles and Con-
textualised Operation: The reason-
ing deployed in security theories is
universal in nature in the sense that
a security theory sets out universal
frameworks and principles that ap-
ply to everyone. However, the doing
of security is largely contextualised
and it is in this contextualisation
that the opportunity arises for pos-
itive and negative security to inter-
operate. Whilst the security frame-
works themselves tend to have either positive or negative security goals,
the carrying out of security enables these goals to be nuanced and
threaded with protection and enablement.
Contextualisation is an important means of introducing the security
pluralism needed for everyday life. As feminist security scholar, Heidi
Hudson, highlights the operationalisation of security can be contex-
tualised if individuals and communities are acknowledged as active
participants in the security framework (Hudson, 2005).
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2.3 Relating the Theories to the Technological
Technological security represents
di erent security interests
Studies and practices of technolog-
ical security have been largely sep-
arated from the broader discussions
of state, individual and societal se-
curities. Technological security is,
however, complex and draws on all
of the strands of security thinking
that we have discussed in this chap-
ter. On the one hand, technolog-
ical security often represents the
interests of powerful institutions,
whether that be the state or technol-
ogy companies or other institutions
of power. On the other hand, the
security interests that technological
security represents can elicit strong
responses from the people using the
technology and this, in turn, can
shape the way the technology is used.
As societies become increasingly digitally-mediated, the state (and
other institutions of power) and the individual come into direct conver-
sation with fewer intermediaries. In a sense, technological security is
the seam through which many of the security interests of the state and
other institutions of power in a digitally-mediated society come into
direct conversation with the security of the individual. As a result, tech-
nological security should not only focus on a negative security position
that focuses on protection from threats, but must also enable access to
the benefits that technology o ers in such a way that the technology
user can be free from fear.
Security theories also raise questions about the way that technologi-
cal security is designed and deployed. For example:
• “Should the idea of social contract and notion of human rights be
included in the way we design and deploy technological security?”
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• “Should we consider which values are implicitly being ordered by
security technologies when the e ectiveness of security technologies
are evaluated?”
• “Does a deployment of security technologies change the ordering
of values or who is included (or excluded)within that order?”
• “Should we model the impacts of technological security in eco-
nomic, political and social terms as well as in terms of the technical
performance of the security technology itself?”
• “Do the social and political meanings of technological security
change if the political security goals are changed?”
Security technologies have
social and political meanings
The need for asking these questions
that consider the social, political
and economic context can be seen
in the work of Molotch (2013). This
work that highlights the importance
of both protection and enablement
when he writes about how security
technologies must protect against
harms, but in such a way that does
not undermine people’s access to
services. Denying people’s access to
services or necessary support can
weaken them to the point where the
service no longer has the desired out-
come. An example of this is given by Lester et al. (2019) in the context
of the design of detention centres where, it is argued that designing
prisons using technologies that support the prisoner, as well as punish
them, enabling the criminal justice system to meet the twin goals of
punishment and rehabilitation.
Central to studies in cybersecurity is the understanding that tech-
nological security is connected to the security interests of institutions of
power. There is a rich body of work that encompasses the global patterns
of technology adoption within society and the roles governments play
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in responding to cybersecurity challenges (Whyte, 2018). This results
in several areas of cybersecurity study ranging from mechanisms of
cyber conflict and global cybersecurity governance to global resistance
movements in cyberspace and the development of new cybersecurity
technologies. The focus of cybersecurity studies in this sense examines
the development of digital technologies from the perspective of the state
and how such technologies change global power structures.
When looking at cybersecurity from the perspective of technological
security, cybersecurity might be regarded as the political and social
dimensions of technological security (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009)
which means that risks are both in terms of the risks to technology
but also from technology (Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010). Shires (2019)
presents technological security as a form of cybersecurity and breaks it
down into three practical worldviews which are practice-based rather
than theory-based. These three worldviews are:
• National cybersecurity: a national perspective that focuses on the
networks and technologies within the state’s boundaries;
• Commercial cybersecurity: an organisational perspective that
focuses on the networks and technologies within both for-profit
and not-for-profit organisations;
• Individual cybersecurity: an individual perspective that focuses
on the protection of an individual’s technology.
Shires (2019) uses Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance to anal-
yse how these three worldviews relate, and how they di er. This analysis
shows that whilst national cybersecurity interprets technological security
from the state perspective, and in terms of a conflict regarding control
of the internet, also highlights how there is overlap with the economic
imperative of organisational cybersecurity, with both perspectives shar-
ing a similar cybersecurity practice. In the categorisation produced by
Shires (2019), the focus is on the protection of the assets relating to
the organisation, state and individual. However, this analysis might be
extended to consider how technological security, when harnessed to a
social or political security logic that is intended not only to protect
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assets but also exclude some from accessing those assets, can result
in the technological security controls being experienced as mean and
pernicious. This is particularly salient when considering the experiences
of people dependent on digital by default services for essential support,
as found in in areas of welfare, health, housing and finance. In the case
of digitalised welfare, technological controls are often experienced as
mean and pernicious (Coles-Kemp et al., 2020a) because the welfare
policy that such controls enact regards welfare claimants as potential
misusers of the digital welfare system.
Technological security has
social, economic and political
dependencies
Regardless of which practical
worldview is being deployed, tech-
nological security has traditionally
focused on negative security be-
cause its goal is to ensure that
technological systems and services
remain available, and are reliable
through the regulation of access.
Shires (2019) states “[c]ybersecurity
can be defined as the prevention and
mitigation of malicious interference
with digital devices and networks”.
This means that technological secu-
rity is focused on the protection of
technology and data from threats of unauthorised access, unauthorised
modification and unauthorised disclosure. The enablement dimension
of security is noticeably absent in such a characterisation, and perhaps
there is an implicit assumption that the social, economic and political
context into which the technology was deployed would provide the
means and the mechanisms to bring about positive security.
However, as digital technologies and services have become embedded
into everyday objects as well as our de facto means of accessing essential
services, building and maintaining social and bureaucratic relationships
- the security issues related to digital technologies are greater than
protecting assets and encompass protecting our way of life. This means
that we have to think about both positive and negative security issues,
who is excluded as well as included by technological security and the
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economic, social and political implications of technological security
decisions. This shift also means that we have to think about security not
only in material terms (i.e. the technologies we can use to protect us),
but also in ideal terms (i.e. the ideals that we are striving to achieve).
Political and social theories of security highlight that securing in a
given situation is achieved by a combination of the technology and
social and political processes - a point that is often not clearly made in
technological security studies.
2.4 Concluding Comments
This chapter has set out a pallet of security concepts and analytical
techniques that enable us to examine some of the di erent forms of
security that technological security intersects with. Social and political
theories of security provide di erent views as to what should be secured,
di erent notions of who or what does the securing, and o er a range
of strategies for carrying out these securing processes. These di erent
ways of looking at security problems are important because it is not
enough to secure the individual parts of a digital service or technology,
we also need to understand how the security of technologies intersect
with the security of people if we want truly secure digital products. In
the next chapter, we look at how technological security has traditionally
recognised the intersections with other securities, and how it responds
to them.
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Security technology fits into
a broader set of security logics
In the UK Research Council
funded project Families Separated
by Prison (UKRI, 2020), we ex-
amined how families separated by
prison view and engage with the sup-
port services provided to them. We
learned that to understand the em-
bodied aspects of information shar-
ing and protection practices in this
context, we needed to not only un-
derstand the security goals of fam-
ilies and the criminal justice sector
but also the design of the informa-
tion control technologies and how
these reflect criminal justice policies.
Understanding the design of the technological security is as important
as understanding the broader security themes that shape the responses
to technological security.
35
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Technological security is focused on the protection of data and
technology and places an emphasis on the security of the transaction
between human and computer or between computer and computer,
rather than placing the security of the technology in the wider security
context in which it is being used. Technological security was originally a
coalition of digital network security, computer security and the security
of the data itself. However, as technology and its uses have evolved,
these sites of security have also become cloud security, security of edge
computing and critical national infrastructure security.
Whilst computers were not originally designed with security in mind,
by the 1970s computer security was becoming a focus of research and a
concern of practice (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975; Caine, 1977). Not only
was there concern about the vulnerability of data and of computational
power but also the implications of computing for the safety and security
of the individual (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975).
Security concerns for both
technology and people
These two concerns are not dis-
connected but the drive to encour-
age take up of computer technol-
ogy and services resulted in a fore-
grounding of the benefits of technol-
ogy and a backgrounding of the po-
tential harms. This drive also meant
that the benefits were not consid-
ered for society as a whole or for
where benefits were most needed but
for where there would be greatest
commercial benefit.
In this chapter the principles of
technological security are briefly out-
lined and the process and challenges of implementing technological
security are sketched. The chapter then looks at two developments
of practice: security management and usable security. These have the
potential to connect technological security with other forms of security
and to an individual’s embodied sense of security.
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3.1 Basic Underpinning Principles
There are three core technological security principles: confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Gollmann (1999) defines these terms as:
• Confidentiality: prevention of unauthorised disclosure of informa-
tion.
• Integrity: prevention of unauthorised modification of information.
• Availability: prevention of unauthorised withholding of informa-
tion resources.
Security technologies regulate society as well as data
Additional principles might be needed depending on the application, for
example principles of authenticity and accountability can be added (Goll-
mann, 1999). These principles are used to protect technological compo-
nents, software, applications and digital services. The history of these
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principles go back to the start of computer security as a profession and
technical practice. Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) wrote a tutorial paper
on the protection of information systems. It is one of the first papers to
summarise the principles of securing information systems and it lists
the categories of security violations as follows:
• Unauthorised information release: this category of violation con-
travenes the confidentiality principles and information is available
to those who are not authorised to access it.
• Unauthorised information modification: this category of violation
contravenes the integrity principle and information is modified in
ways that are not authorised.
• Unauthorised denial of use: this category of violation contravenes
the availability principle and information is not available to those
who are authorised to access that information.
In each case Saltzer and Schroeder point out that these violations do not
necessarily require access to information or a programme. For example,
they highlight that unauthorised information release can take the form
of an attacker observing a pattern of information and inferring meaning
from that pattern without having access to the information. Similarly,
an attacker might change information but does not necessarily have to
see the changes they have made for sabotage to occur. Finally, they
make the case that denial of use (commonly referred to as a denial
of service attack in the cyber security domain) can happen when an
attacker disrupts the processing of information but this can happen
without an attacker having access to or modifying the information itself.
After completing this list, Saltzer and Schroeder reflect on the term
“unauthorised”: “The term “unauthorized” in the three categories listed
above means that release, modification, or denial of use occurs contrary
to the desire of the person who controls the information, possibly even
contrary to the constraints supposedly enforced by the system” (Saltzer
and Schroeder, 1975, p. 1280). This quotation highlights that techno-
logical security terms often have both social and technological meaning.
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Security technologies touch
many aspects of our lives
The tutorial also brings out the
layered nature of technological se-
curity, by first addressing security
at the very core of a computer sys-
tem, moving through the applica-
tion, data processing and communi-
cation layers to the layer that inter-
acts with the users of the technology.
Saltzer and Schroeder also recog-
nise that technological controls are
not always necessary or needed: “In
many cases, it is not necessary to
meet the protection needs of the
person responsible for the informa-
tion stored in the computer entirely through computer-aided enforce-
ment” (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975, p. 1281). There is an implicit
assumption in this statement that the protection needs of people will
be met in other ways. Forty-five years later, and in a society where
many of our interactions are digitally mediated, this assumption can
lead to a gap in protection of the individual. Whilst the technologi-
cal protection techniques that Saltzer and Schroeder describe are not
necessarily current today, and the state of the art of these techniques
have since evolved, the design principles that they list are still current
today. Saltzer and Schroeder list eight design principles that system
and software designers should follow to minimise security flaws and
guide the design of a secure system. Significantly, this is one of the first
papers of its type to take usability into account. The eighth principle
is termed “Psychological acceptability” and the principle specifies that
“the human interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely
and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly” (Saltzer
and Schroeder, 1975, p. 1283). However, it is not only usability that is
called for but the recommendation that: “Also, to the extent that the
user’s mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanisms he
must use, mistakes will be minimized” (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975,
p. 1283). This alignment between the mental model of control and its
design becomes harder as the communities using technology diversify.
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Security technologies impact people
Saltzer and Schroeder also identify two additional design principles
which, they claim, do not fit perfectly with computer systems but which
need to be considered further. These two principles are:
• Work factor - assessing the amount of work an attacker needs to
undertake in comparison to the gain they will receive; and
• Compromise recording - a tamper-proof means of recording vio-
lations and system compromises.
These are both principles that are heavily dependent on the context
of use, whilst also highlighting the sociotechnical nature of security.
They also highlight the conflicted way that users of technology are
conceptualised in technological security. On the one hand, technological
security thinking is designed to reduce the problems caused by flawed
software coding and system design. On the other hand, security is
also achieved by thinking the unthinkable: “What if people cannot be
trusted to comply with the goals of the system and what if people
try to subvert the system for unauthorised means?”. Over time this
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thinking has become the norm, the start point being that people cannot
be trusted. In so doing, the new unthinkable question became: “what
if people are trusted?”. As we shall see later on in this chapter, the
relationship between trust, people and computing became a key concern
of the usable security community and becomes the start point for an
alternative technological security paradigm.
3.1.1 Security and Software
Many of the design principles set out by Saltzer and Schroeder still sit
at the core of design processes and frameworks for the design of safe and
secure software. For example, the introduction of security functionality
into code design has been encouraged through the conceptualisation
of the Security Design Lifecycle (SDL) introduced by Microsoft in
2006 (Howard and Lipner, 2006), that has now become the SafeCode
initiative. SDL has threat modelling processes at its core that enable
software developers to identify potential weaknesses and attack vectors
in the code, during its design (Shostack, 2008). The goal still remains
that security thinking is “baked into” the software design process as a
part of the software development lifecycle (Geer, 2010; Potter, 2009).
In response to the introduction of agile design processes in software
development, e orts have been made to make the process of producing
safe software more agile and responsive to the software coding practices
of developers. However, aligning security thinking with software coding
practices can prove problematic. Reasons for this di culty include a lack
of knowledge and interest in the inclusion of security functionality (Weir
et al., 2016). In addition, security application programming interfaces
(API) are di cult to implement (Nadi et al., 2016) and the processes
needed to communicate software flaws are not always easy to implement
in the software development lifecycle (Lopez et al., 2012). The UK’s
Research Institute for Sociotechnical Cyber Security has recognised the
challenges of implementing a SDL into the wider software development
lifecycle and has sponsored several projects, including “Motivating Jenny
to write Secure Software” (OpenUniversity, 2020).
Software code is often developed in teams of coders with di erent
levels of ability and skills (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011), which can make
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
42 Technological Security and Its Users
the production of reliable code complex (Bjarnason and Sharp, 2017).
Motivating software development teams is also a complex task, as ex-
plained by the canon of literature presented in the literature review of
Beecham et al. (2008) on the topic. The problems of motivating teams
to produce reliable code are further complicated by the economic and
business pressures of software projects (Rosenberg, 2008). Consequently,
while Saltzer and Schroeder’s principles might seem simple, their imple-
mentation is challenging as software developers are typically contracted
to produce a working product not a secure working product.
It is also noticeable that software development processes such as
SDL, typically do not include principles that directly take into account
the people for whom the software is being designed. As a result, whilst
provision is made for training, Saltzer and Schroeder’s provision for
psychological acceptability is not directly attended to, as explained by
Caputo et al. (2016). The lack of focus on the psychological accept-
ability of security controls leads to security controls being deployed
without consideration for their impact on a person’s workload, or on
the emotional responses that might be triggered by the design of the
security controls. This is perhaps because there is an expectation that
the security controls not only secure the software code but in securing
the code will also secure the people using the software. Without attend-
ing to the psychological acceptability principle, the likelihood of poorly
designed and implemented security controls that are not universally
accessible or beneficial is significantly increased.
3.2 The Art of Management
The deployment and management of the technology is an important
complement to secure software design and creates the environment
in which security technologies are used. There are also processes that
are often tasked with overcoming the security gaps and shortfalls of
digital products. The secure deployment and management of digital
technologies and services is governed by standards and regulation. There
are standards that regulate the design of the cryptographic algorithm
all the way to the implementation of security controls in an organisation.
Security in general and security of technology in particular are especially
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Poorly designed and implemented security controls increase insecurities
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prone to the deployment of standards partly to preserve interoperability
and partly because security itself is a contested concept. It has been
argued that where there is contestation, standards are used to resolve
such disputes (Power, 1994).
As digital products and services are deployed in ever wider and more
open contexts of use, the potential for conflicts in terms of the security
required and how it should manifest itself becomes increasingly more
likely.
Security management acts as
a form of conflict management
Such conflicts require arbitra-
tion and processes through which
consensus can be arrived at and
risks of disagreeement and dissent
managed. Arbitration in the case
of technological security is man-
aged through a series of manage-
ment processes outlined in secu-
rity management standards: in par-
ticular the international standard,
ISO/IEC 27001. Security manage-
ment is often presented as a con-
tinuous process and in early ver-
sions of the standardisation of se-
curity management, this continuous
process was sometimes termed the
“Plan, Do, Check, Act” (PDCA) cy-
cle and was applied to individual
security management processes of
risk assessment, risk management
(including risk treatment, risk moni-
toring and risk communication), au-
dit, incident management, training
and awareness and management re-
view.
As shown in the following two examples, there are several points in
the cycle to identify conflict and to negotiate consensus at these points
of conflict. In this respect, the security management processes are more
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than a simple bureaucratic exercise. For example, risk assessment can
be broken down as follows:
• Plan the scope of the risk assessment, select risk assessment tools.
• Do the risk assessment by identifying assets, the threats and
vulnerabilities to the assets and assess the measure of risk of
the threat exploiting the vulnerability of a particular asset using
selected risk calculation.
• Check the calculations of the risk assessment.
• Act to revise the calculations where necessary.
Similarly, the security audit process can be broken down as follows:
• Plan: Identify the scope of the audit, identify the audit methods
and the audit team and set the audit plan.
• Do the audit: Carry out the audit programme.
• Check: Discuss and revise audit findings; Review corrective action.
• Act: Revise audit findings in view of corrective action review.
In addition to processes, security management also uses the notion
of a policy to articulate and set security goals, set direction for the
use of technological security within an organisation, and provide a
benchmark against which security can be assessed. At the core of security
management is the principle of compliance, using the technological
security as expected and gathering, processing, storing and sharing
information in ways that conformed with the security policy.
There are many challenges with such a management approach, not
least because gathering evidence that mitigation works is complex, as
is determining what mitigation practices work and what constitutes
e ective mitigation. At the same time, such processes only work as mit-
igation and protection strategies if there is buy-in to the security goals.
Such an approach also assumes that people accept that security risk is,
to a degree, individualised. This means that there is a responsibilisation
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of technological security in the sense that individuals are expected to
carry the responsibility of taking protective action (Renaud et al., 2018;
MacEwan, 2017). Renaud et al. (2018) argue that responsibilisation
should be minimised and a focus should be given to a cyber security
approach that is state-led and e ectively implements security standards,
gathers information on cybercrime and sanctions insecure behaviours.
3.2.1 Security Dialogue
Whilst security management is in many respects another materialist
form of security – largely focusing on processes and policies – security
management also works at the intersections between technological secu-
rity and other forms of security dealing with the conflicts that arise in
these environments. The main security management activity at these
intersections is security dialogue. The dialogue is used to bring together
di erent stakeholders and to undertake di erent ways of securing to
align di erent worldviews on what an organisation requires from tech-
nological security (Burdon and Coles-Kemp, 2019). As a basis for this,
some studies have focused on how to build skills related to the con-
struction of dialogue and to cope with dissent and conflict (Ashenden
and Lawrence, 2016; Reinfelder et al., 2019). The relevance of security
dialogue is revealed in a study on organisational access control (Stevens
and Wulf, 2002) where the relationship is illustrated between inter-
organisational cooperation and the assets that need most protection
and how processes of inter-organisational cooperation have to be able
to respond to the tensions that arise over access to key assets.
Security practitioners encourage and enable compliant behaviours
within an organisation (Burdon et al., 2016) and this requires a secu-
rity dialogue that makes security legible to non-experts. The broader
sociotechnical security literature has looked at the types of interactions
that security practitioners have had with other parts of an organisation.
For example, the practices of the security profession have been critiqued
as being too technocratic (Stewart and Lacey, 2012) and contributing
to a divide between security practitioners and the groups of people with
whom they are working (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009).
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One of the criticisms has been that security practitioners often
lack self-reflection and the ability to consider how their own attitudes,
behaviours and styles of communication can block engagement with
the individuals and groups whose data and technology they are trying
to secure (Ashenden and Sasse, 2013). To respond to these challenges,
security practitioners themselves have tried to diversify their forms of
engagement (Reinfelder et al., 2019).
Security practitioners need to under-
stand people as well as technology
Some of these dialogues take
the form of interactions (Burdon
et al., 2016) that are often part
of formal processes such as risk
assessment (Baskerville, 1991), au-
dit, and training and awareness (Al-
brechtsen and Hovden, 2010). In
a bid to improve engagement and
understanding of the security con-
cerns of non-specialists, the role
of guardians and mentors have
been considered (Haney and Lutters,
2017; Becker et al., 2017). Such indi-
viduals act as a connector between
technological security expertise and
non-experts.
In the community setting, this
is considered to be a guardian
role o ering protection to vulner-
able individuals such as elderly peo-
ple (Nicholson et al., 2019). In an
organisational environment, this interlocutor is framed more as a cham-
pion of security, encouraging a wider take-up of compliant security
practices (Gabriel and Furnell, 2011; Becker et al., 2017).
Research shows that security communication in an organisation is
primarily focused on the creation of messages that “sell” security prac-
tices (Ashenden and Lawrence, 2013; Burdon et al., 2016; Chipperfield
and Furnell, 2010), particularly by making such messages relatable to
particular groups within an organisation (Harbach et al., 2014). There
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has therefore been a focus on how to deepen and diversify interactions
between security practitioners and other groups within an organisa-
tion, both from the practice and research communities (NCSC, 2019;
Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010).
3.3 Usable Security
Security dialogue and management cannot fully compensate for poorly
designed security technology. Even if the software and security com-
ponents are well-designed, they need to be accessible and usable to
the intended product user communities. Not only must the security
technologies be accessible and usable but so too must the processes that
surround them.
Security technology with poor
usability can disempower people
The original design principles
for safe and secure software largely
focus on the internal design of
the software. However, Saltzer and
Schroeder (1975) also included a
principle regarding the usability of
secure software. Such a principle has
a focus on the people using the se-
curity technology and fitting the se-
curity technology to people’s needs
and practices rather than the other
way around. Saltzer and Schroeder’s
paper was one of the first to in-
troduce the notion of usable secu-
rity (CyBOK, 2019b). It was not un-
til the 1990s that usable security be-
came an acknowledged area of both
security practice and scholarship. In the mid-1990s Zurko and Simon
(1996) created the term “user-centred security” and outlined three cate-
gories for user-centred security practice: usability testing for systems
development; the development of security models and mechanisms to
be used in user-friendly systems; and making the needs of users the
primary goal of secure system design and development. Zurko and Si-
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mon regarded usable security as a necessity for systems that responded
to “real world problems” or problems as experienced by people who use
systems.
Zurko and Simon highlight one of the cultural conflicts in secu-
rity scholarship that still a ects the study of technological security
today: the prioritising of mathematical rigour over other forms of rigour.
They phrase this as “Mathematical rigor was emphasized over usabil-
ity” (Zurko and Simon, 1996), but then go on to point out that whilst
social systems can be modelled mathematically, such modelling leaves
out many aspects of security practice. This observation has been echoed
in much subsequent work and as technology has become woven into
everyday practice, this observation has been extended to a societal as
well as an individual understanding of practice (Bella and Coles-Kemp,
2012).
Adams and Sasse (1999) wrote a paper titled ‘Users are Not the
Enemy’. The title and framing of the paper challenges the notion that
people are the weakest link in security and are responsible for making
technology vulnerable to attack. Adams and Sasse argued that non-
compliance is caused not by laziness or a lack of interest in technological
security but due to the design of the controls or a lack of knowledge
by people. They also argue that focusing on the strength of the control
rather than the usability of the control can make a technological control
less e ective because the control will not be complied with. Adams and
Sasse’s paper presents a study that demonstrates the implications of
not considering human factors and provides evidence to support the
position in Zurko and Simon (1996).
The lines of argument in Adams’ and Sasse’s paper were borne out
in two areas of usable security research: making security legible for
non-experts and designing security controls in line with the needs of
people. Both these research themes and concomitant practice areas are
significant because they represent the first time that a concerted e ort
is made to return to Saltzer and Schroeder (1975)’s twin objectives of
both protecting technology and people.
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3.3.1 The Need for Usable Security
Research shows that a ‘compliance overhead’ (Beautement et al., 2009)
can result from unnecessarily complex security rules that do not support
the tasks that people have to carry out. Complex rules can be further
exacerbated by poorly designed technologies and compliance regimes.
The true cost of this type of security overhead is rarely calculated (In-
glesant and Sasse, 2010). This cost of ill-fitting security is di cult to
assess, because compliance is not a single behaviour (Blythe et al., 2015)
and because there are a multitude of factors that influence compliance.
Blythe et al. (2015) lists these factors as:
• Self-e cacy, which is an individual’s belief about their own ability
to perform a security task or exert an influence over it.
• Social influence, which is the extent to which an individual’s
behaviour is influenced by others.
• Attitude towards the task.
• Perceived susceptibility towards a security threat against which
the task is designed to protect.
• Perceived severity of the threat.
• Response e cacy, which is the extent to which a task is regarded
as an adequate response to the threat.
• Response cost, which is the time, money and e ort required to
deploy the task.
There is a long history of including people’s needs and requirements
in technology design, but including security requirements in design
specifications has proved problematic because these were requirements
that people did not necessarily feel they needed. The research of Inglesant
and Sasse (2010) shows that complex password rules not only impact on
an individual’s productivity but can also lead to security workarounds.
However, whilst the term workaround has negative connotations, such
practices can equally/also be positive and supportive (Woltjer, 2017).
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Technological security is not a one-size fits all approach
However, it is not only the design of controls that can make it di cult
to comply with security policy and guidance. MacEwan (2017) describes
a “responsibilisation conundrum”, where complying with guidance is
problematic because the guidance does not relate to an individual’s lived
experience of the security issues, and does not address the full range
of technological security issues that people have to respond to in their
everyday lives. In not aligning with an individual’s lived experience,
not only are relatable cybersecurity issues not always addressed but
the controls that are proposed can result in a moral conflict over which
course of action to take. Such conflicts can often be found in controls that
relate to monitoring and service access where there is a choice between
achieving a performance goal or a security goal (but not both). This
conflict is further exacerbated by the overhead of additional work and
cognition load that security policy and rules can engender (Beautement
et al., 2009). This can result in “security fatigue” (Furnell and Thomson,
2009; Stanton et al., 2016; Pham et al., 2019), where security task
overload and the challenges of processing conflicting security rules
further complicate responding to security issues. In response to such
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conflicts, an individual may feel forced to break the rules and this, in turn,
can lead to a form of moral conflict where stress induced through feelings
of guilt result from rule breaking. Interestingly, Pham et al. (2019)
demonstrate that neither self-e cacy nor additional organisational
resources are e ective at reducing burnout. The study also showed that
simplifying security tasks is also not e ective in reducing burnout. In the
next section we consider how modelling human-computer interactions
might help to further identify challenges with non-compliance.
3.4 Modelling the Security of Human-Computer Interactions
Human computer interaction is complex and as we move into a world
of sensor technologies, voice activated software and other forms of
pervasive computing, modelling what we understand as the interaction
in a particular context is key. The study of usable security brings
to the fore the importance of modelling security in the context of
human-computer interactions. Identifying where security issues emerge
during interaction and where people’s practices and interactions both
protect and enable interaction are important aspects of security analysis.
Such analysis helps to identify both where security technologies are
needed and also the degree to which existing controls are e ective and
appropriate to the interaction.
These models are a means of identifying the intersections between
technological security and other forms of security, as well as environmen-
tal factors. Di erent types of security analysis (ranging from the social
to the mathematical) require di erent types of abstraction. Abstraction
can be defined as a process of isolating common features or relation-
ships. These abstractions typically take the form of models that present
simplified explanations of the interaction. These simplified explanations
will always be inaccurate but nevertheless models can have a value as
part of security analysis (Box, Draper, et al., 1987).
Currently there are two dominant forms of modelling: modelling
of human-computer interaction through di erent economic lenses, and
sociotechnical modelling that draws out the di erent human-computer
interactions in a particular security scenario.
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3.4.1 Economics of Security
Making the argument for usable security has increasingly been made
in economic rather than social or political terms and modelled as such.
In his groundbreaking work Anderson (2001) sets out the argument for
examining information security problems through an economic lens. The
economic drivers were examined within a technological security context,
and in particular investigated how perverse incentives undermine the use
of security technologies. Highlighting how behavioural or organisational
factors can encourage or impede the adoption of security controls, this
research demonstrates why designing security controls that people use
is a di cult and complex task.
Security can be modelled as
a series of economic trade-o s
Acquisti (2013) presented how
both classical economics and be-
havioural economics were of value
to information security. He points
to the economic concept of trade-
o s and frames technological secu-
rity as a trade-o . For example, Her-
ley et al. (2009) considers why pass-
words have not been replaced as a
means of authentication despite be-
ing a source of stress and di culty
for many people. Herley highlights
that whilst the stress may be con-
siderable for individuals, the use of
passwords is convenient for the institution providing the service both
in terms of their implementation and maintenance.
Beautement et al. (2009) tried to address this power imbalance and
developed the idea of productive security. They took up the microeco-
nomic argument by looking at the cost to an individual of complying
with a security policy. They argued that it was important for an organ-
isation to identify where the friction points were in an organisation’s
security policy, so that the additional work and the disruption caused by
the security policy could be reduced through re-design with technological
security becoming more productive as a result.
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Behavioural economics has also been the inspiration for a line of
inquiry that looks at the possibility of nudging security behaviours and
practices. For example, Coventry et al. (2014) have looked at di erent
ways to deploy interventions and re-design security technology so that
users of that technology are encouraged to engage with the technology
in a secure way. However, security behaviours and practices are complex
and often require more than nudges. Designing nudges to a ect any
form of behaviour change has ethical and moral implications as well as
questions of e cacy (Mols et al., 2015). It is also possible that designing
nudges can a ect behaviours negatively (Nicholson et al., 2017). As
a result, careful modelling and analysis is needed to identify where
security controls need to be placed.
Understanding human interaction and practices through an economic
lens has been a dominant force in much of the usable security discussion.
However, such a position does not critically evaluate what security means
in a particular context and to whom. Furthermore, such a position does
not engage with the ways in which security is lived and experienced by
di erent people, or allow for the idea that multiple conceptualisations
of security might be in operation at the same time. When Saltzer
and Schroeder (1975) referred to di erent mental models of security,
the response has been to try to engender a universal mental model
rather than to embrace these di erent security positions and design
technologies that can respond to that plurality.
3.4.2 Sociotechnical Modelling
Usable security is one aspect of technological security scholarship that
has begun to acknowledge social and cultural aspects of technologi-
cal security. Another branch of technological security scholarship to
acknowledge these aspects is sociotechnical security modelling. Such
models are used to help reason about natural examples of system com-
promise or attack (Probst et al., 2006). Attaining the most useful level
of abstraction (Probst and Hansen, 2008) to understand technological
practices as embedded within a social context is one of the challenges
of modelling natural phenomena.
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In this branch of study, sociotechnical systems are acknowledged as
complex systems and often focus on better understanding the interac-
tions between humans and technology (Pieters, 2011). Formal modelling
o ers a language in which to articulate and analyse the connections be-
tween these components. The process of using formal methods requires
researchers to carefully unpack the relationships between the technical
and the social. Formal methods o er a di erent language through which
to reflect on the social (Bella and Coles-Kemp, 2012). This provides
social researchers with an alternative means of deconstructing wider
social concepts and a common language through which to compare
social and technological security components.
Technology shapes people as
much as people shape technology
Sociotechnical modelling has
been particularly dominant when
thinking about “insider threat” to
technological security. The mod-
elling of technological security is
typically understood as attack and
defence and people are framed as
either undertaking the role of at-
tacker or defender. Technological se-
curity also presents another dual-
ism: insider-outsider. The insider is
someone who is within the trusted
perimeter and who by being inside
is themselves trusted. The outsider,
someone who is outside the perime-
ter, is not trusted and the perimeter
is designed to keep those individuals
outside. The insider threat problem
has many definitions (Bishop, 2005b) and insider-outsider is therefore
another concept that, whilst it can be designed as a binary in tech-
nological terms, is considerably more conflicted and fluid in its social
conceptualisation. Sociologist Crinson (2008) has argued that the notion
of insider and outsider is based on a sense of trust and trust is not
binary in this context but a continuum. It is for this reason that Bishop
(2005a) defined the insider problem as a continuum of problems.
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3.4.3 Emergent Forms of Modelling
In the last few years, modelling approaches that draw on the human-
ities and creative practices have begun to emerge in both security
research and practice. One example of this is the creative engagements
work (Dunphy et al., 2014) that sets out ways of engaging that produce
creative abstractions of security-related scenarios. Such approaches are
typically built on narrative methodologies. For example, Vines et al.
(2012) used a narrative approach with older participants to examine
how cheques were used in everyday financial transactions with a view
to understanding how digital technology might replace cheques.
Physical modelling techniques using creative materials such as LEGO
has been used in di erent ways to model security-related scenarios.
For example, Frey et al. (2017) designed a games format that used
LEGO as the medium through which to explore potential threats to
critical national infrastructure. Hall et al. (2015) also o er an alternative
example of modelling that uses LEGO to describe scenarios together with
a facilitated process to identify security issues and co-design responses.
3.5 Concluding Comments
Usable security and security management have broadened technological
security and introduced its scholarship and practice to alternative
ways of thinking about technological security. However, both usable
security and security management stay firmly in the technological
security paradigm and focus on how best to support the protection of
technology and data in a way that is supportive to the user.
In this next chapter, drawing inspiration from social and political
theories of security, we explore how this paradigm might be adjusted
to consider the intersections between technological security and other
forms of security.
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Connecting Technological Security and Security
Theory
Digitalised welfare is a common theme in many of our projects. When
working with marginalised and underserved communities, the digital-
isation of welfare is the point at which digital interaction becomes
mandated for many people in those communities.
Security technologies are designed with particular assumptions
Digitalised welfare is one of many examples where technological security
becomes interwoven into a wider security policy (Coles-Kemp et al.,
2020a). Whilst technological security is typically designed, engineered
and deployed without explicit reference to social and political theories of
security, security technologies nevertheless deploy a security logic that
is formed from a particular worldview, and has associated assumptions
57
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about the groups who will use the system, their security needs, and the
potential attackers of the system.
Attacks are often seen as inevitable
At an initial glance, technolog-
ical security seems most clearly
aligned with the more traditional
forms of security thinking. For ex-
ample, technological security is of-
ten deployed with a mindset that
attack will happen and that there
needs to be su cient defence, in the
form of security controls, to repel
attack. The deployment of techno-
logical security takes place using a series of cost vs. benefit trade-o s
to determine which controls are deployed and where. The deployment
of technological security is also usually conducted through collabora-
tion agreements between parties that will access the technology and is
bounded by regulation and law.
Our worldview shapes whom
we see as attackers
In general, security thinking is
ground in a particular way of see-
ing the world and technological se-
curity is no di erent in this respect.
Rogaway (2009) has argued that,
for example, cryptographic prob-
lems are socially constructed in the
sense that they are produced from
a particular worldview that priori-
tises specific types of problems. The
social construction of scientific and
technological problems is a position
of Science and Technology Studies
(STS) (Sismondo, 2010, pp. 57–71)
which argues that the prioritisation
and form of problems is cultural and social. In this chapter we look at
some of the di erent perspectives that shape the meaning of security
issues in a digital context.
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To recap, as outlined in Chapter 2, Balzacq (2010) argues that “The-
ories can be committed to di erent kinds of ontology, but two broad
categories capture the range of possibilities on o er: materialism and
idealism on the one hand, and monism, dualism and pluralism, on the
other”. By sketching the conceptual space in this way, we are also
able to think about complex technological architectures in di erent
ways (Whyte, 2018; Balzacq and Cavelty, 2016).
Table 4.1: Ontological positions applied to technological security
Ontological pairings Digital Example
Materialism-dualism Access control technologies
Idealism-pluralism Security dialogue
As shown in Table 4.1, it could be argued technological security
already deploys some of these ontological pairings. For example, a
firewall is a form of materialism in the sense that it is both an artefact
that represents technological thinking about how to protect a network
from an unwanted ingress or egress but it is also a means of defending
and protecting territory.
Material forms of security
control many aspects of our lives
The firewall represents a form
of dualism in the sense that its
e cacy can only be proven once
we have a hypothesis as to what
ingress/egress attempts are autho-
rised and unauthorised access, and
can determine from what we observe
whether an attempt is authorised.
It also represents a binary form of
thinking by constructing the notion
of access as something that is either
permitted or denied. By contrast,
security dialogue is a form of idealism in the sense that the goals of
security dialogue are the ideal of making individuals secure in their
relationships with each other by building trust and empathy through
dialogue. It can also be described as a form of pluralism in the sense
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that the security outcomes and inputs come from multiple actors and
represent di erent viewpoints and di erent understandings of what
constitutes the real world.
By recognising di erent possible ontological combinations, a way
forward opens up for responding to security issues that emerge at the
intersections between technological security and other forms of security.
As Table 4.1 also shows, whilst we may think of technological security
as materialist-dualist, in the securing spaces that support and enable
the technologies – such as those used for security dialogue – alternative
ontological combinations are possible. In the following sections we look
at some of the ways we might re-shape our security technology thinking
to take into account a broader range of ontological security positions.
4.1 Re-shaping Technological Security Thinking
The following are three of the possible ways in which we might re-
imagine, re-design or extend technological security, drawing on social
and political theories of security as inspiration.
Changing the threat model: Political and social security theories show
a broader range of actors and stakeholders than is usually considered in
the study and practice of technological security. Additionally, political
and social theories of security articulate a broader range of security
harms than is typically considered in technological security. Drawing
inspiration from this, we might develop threat models that assume the
perspective of a di erent stakeholder, both in terms of addressing the
security issues and goals of that stakeholder, or formulate the concept
of strength and weakness from another perspective.
Security binary: Threat models are typically constructed as a binary,
such as attack and defence, and then under that category a related
set of binaries are found: authorised and unauthorised, and malicious
and benign. This is a typical position of traditional security thinking.
However, by shifting towards a pluralist position, these binaries could
be replaced by an acknowledgement of di erent security outcomes for
di erent stakeholder groups. In responding to this pluralist position,
trust, consensus building, conflict identification and resolution become
the central tenet, rather than attack and defence.
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Artefact or experience: Security technologies take particular material
forms and are a product of the science that informs them. Material forms
tend to align security technologies with a positivist outlook on security,
by linking security technologies to forms of science that reduce security
as a concept to the protection of self from others. By including an
embodied or experiential position, the technological security focus will
also encompass the felt experience of the security technologies, and how
security technologies might invoke particular responses from di erent
groups and individuals. To achieve this security technology design
might take inspiration from theoretical positions such as ontological
security, theories of care and theories of human security. In the following
sections we examine three perspectives or worldviews into which we
might introduce these re-imaginings.
In the following three sections we look at where we might introduce
the above opportunities for re-design. We set out three interconnected
perspectives that have routinely surfaced in our research. These are:
• Top-down perspective: this takes the position of security technolo-
gies being deployed by technology experts to maintain or change
a particular order.
• Everyday perspective: this takes the position of security tech-
nologies being deployed in a collaboration between technology
expert and non-experts in response to security issues that occur
in everyday life.
• Internal perspective: this takes the position of the way individuals
experience and embody technological security.
4.2 Top-down Perspective – a Default Position
Security technologies have traditionally been designed from the perspec-
tive of those regarded as experts in a particular area of technological
security. Traditionally, in network and computer security, security tech-
nologies are often designed on the basis of an order or a hierarchy of
technology users, where the user at the top of the hierarchy has the most
power in terms of data and resource access and that power degrades
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
62 Connecting Technological Security and Security Theory
down through the hierarchy. Access is a form of protection, and protec-
tion of data, networks and devices is made possible through limiting and
controlling access. This access control articulates the terms of a binary
of inclusion-exclusion: those who are granted access (included) vs. those
who are not granted access (excluded). Whilst there are technological
developments that may move control away from a hierarchical structure
of control to a more egalitarian one where individual users have sole
control over access to data, the fundamental security logic remains the
same.
Security technologies are designed
by experts
The dominant narrative that sur-
rounds technological security is the
prevention of harms, protection of
key assets and the use of technology
to protect key assets. Whilst the em-
phasis might be di erent, there is
nevertheless a common focus on pro-
tection and defence against threat
actors who are seeking to damage
or access something of value. The
narrative of protection often uses bi-
naries, for example attack-defence,
authorised-unauthorised and strong-
weak. Doty argued that tradition-
ally, security is a logic of bina-
ries: challenge-resistance, defence-escalation, recognition-defeat (Doty,
1998, p. 80). These binaries can also be found in technological security,
and are represented by binaries such as authorised vs. unauthorised,
insider vs. outsider and malicious vs. benign. These binaries are used to
formulate rules about what constitutes secure and insecure behaviour
in a technological setting.
The technological control is used to determine which side of the
binary an action or event falls. The strength of the control in technologi-
cal security is often measured through its ability to control access to the
perimeter of the technology, and to control what happens within the
boundaries of the technology. The strength of the control is measured
both in terms of its resistance to attack, but also in the context of
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Security technologies often enable other material forms of security
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the strength of the attacker (Carlos et al., 2013; Martina et al., 2015),
where the notion of strength is socially-constructed in similar ways
to the security problem. Shires (2020) highlights that those enacting
technological security and, by extension, the controls themselves, often
struggle to determine into which category technological actions should
fall (for example the di erence between authorised and unauthorised ac-
cess, because those binaries have a moral basis which is often conflicted
and fluid).
Security is at times a game
rather than a moral choice
The morality of technological se-
curity control can be further mud-
dled by the measurement of the con-
trol strength in terms of its eco-
nomic value. This is an economic
strength that is measured both
through its ability to protect assets
where value is measured in economic
terms, and in terms of cost of loss,
again measured in economic terms
if the controls fail. By considering
security controls in economic terms,
their social and political meaning
is often lost. Technological security
seldom includes conceptualisations
of social impact, morality or ethics and the main processes and ap-
proaches to assessing the strength of controls rarely acknowledge these
perspectives. As a result, gaps can appear between how a security tech-
nology is designed to feel, look and work like, and how it feels, looks
and works like for those using it.
These gaps and silences can result in adverse social impacts and can
have implications for the e ectiveness of security controls, given that
they o er spaces in which security technologies can be outmanoeuvred
and circumvented (Coles-Kemp et al., 2014). In the following section,
some of these implications.
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4.2.1 Negative E ects of the Top-Down Perspective
Designing security technologies without taking social impact into ac-
count can result in the following:
• Language and concepts that focus on the protection of technology
rather than people as the end goal.
• Articulate threats that are not regarded as meaningful in a person’s
life.
• Produce technologies that are di cult to use and require capabili-
ties and resources that people do not have access to.
Security technology design can encode particular biases
The material form of security technology, and the functionality that
such technology has, can exclude on grounds of usability, legibility and
accessibility. It can also exclude because it expects a particular set
of resources and capabilities, including access to technology, access to
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knowledge and also access to power to make particular choices about
what to access, when and how. The material form can also exclude
simply because it is not relevant or useful to the security issues that
people face.
However, it is not simply in the design and framing of the security
technologies that exclusion occurs. It can also be the case that security
technologies enable services that in turn implement a logic of security
that excludes. For example, the shift in exclusion through new condi-
tions in the UK’s welfare policy revision of 2012 were implemented using
digital technologies, the access to which was regulated through tech-
nological security controls. The underlying security logic can therefore
exclude in the following ways:
• By aiding and abetting the creation of systems that make people
feel devalued, threatened or isolated.
• By limiting the social interactions and relationships necessary for
creating the trust foundation on which security technologies can
be e ective.
Exclusion creates resistance and
hostility
Security technologies are harnessed
and put to work by the security logic
underpinning a particular service or
technology. This logic can empower,
protect and support some groups,
but can also disempower, threaten
and alienate others. The logic can
also o er a form of security that is
not meaningful to certain/particular
groups of people. These types of ex-
clusions can be overlooked, misun-
derstood and trivialised when they
are not seen or understood by those who design and deploy the logic. For
example, access to a digital health service might o er personal choice
and freedom to some, but might be bewildering or demand digital skills
or infrastructure that some simply do not have.
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Exclusion can result in responses that might o er the individual
security in the short term, but may not be in either the best interests
of either the state or other institutions, or indeed of the individual, in
the long term. Such responses to exclusion from digital technologies
include (Coles-Kemp et al., 2014):
• Finding a guide or a mentor (community worker, boss, colleague,
family member) to help them figure out how to tackle the system
and services they are struggling with. These might include under-
standing the benefits of the system, how to navigate the priorities
and conditions of service, and learning to trust in the goals and
capabilities of the technology. This can lead to challenges for
technological security because social proxies and shadow users
start to play a part in digital interactions.
• Gaming the system: Twist the system to realise benefits that
matter to you. For example withhold or adjust information that
you feel might disadvantage you. The more irregularities there are
to practices and behaviours, the more volatile the system.
• Opting out and possibly create an alternative system. This, at
the very least, depletes the market for the service; but in certain
essential services, however, such as housing, education, welfare,
employment and healthcare, this can have catastrophic results for
the individual, and create a crisis that services have to respond
to at a later date.
These responses to exclusion are reasoned from the assumption that
the system is designed to exclude, and that the system is in some
way hostile to the users of the system. They can also be embodied
responses to a sense of being attacked or alienated by the system. These
courses of action can have profound impacts on the e ectiveness of the
technological security.
The research undertaken from the VOME project onwards revealed
that people’s worldview of security is not top down, but is a view
constructed in their everyday lived experience, and from their internal
security dialogue. In the following two sections, two alternative security
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Security technologies sometimes remove individual choice
views are presented that have their roots in two di erent ontological
positions: everyday security and ontological security.
4.3 Shifting Perspective to the Everyday
Digital technologies are an intimate
part of our lives
The intersections between techno-
logical security and embodied forms
of security come into view when con-
sidering security through the lens of
the everyday. Shifting to the per-
spective of the everyday, the protec-
tion and support a orded by tech-
nological security is limited, but is
supplemented by trust relations and
a sense of security from identity.
Despite the fact that individuals
are increasingly asked to play a part in national security strategies, the
views of non-elites are rarely sought by governments (Vaughan-Williams
and Stevens, 2016). Instead, security risks are quantified and put into
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national risk registers (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016) without
considering how people conceptualise threat and [in]security.
At the same time, government narratives around security - and
cybersecurity in particular - become increasingly judgemental on is-
sues of non-compliance with government security guidance (MacEwan,
2017). Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2016) emphasise that when an
everyday, non-elite understanding of security comes to the fore, it has
the potential to politicise a threat or an issue that has previously been
presented as un-biased fact. It does this by highlighting how the issue
emerges from power imbalances and from lack of access to resources or
other networks of power. This is termed “everyday security”. Studies of
everyday security have shown (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens, 2016)
that the most important site of security to an individual is themselves
or their families. These studies show that some non-elite framings of
security re-enforce the elite framings. There is often a complex interplay
between the two forms (elite and non-elite) of security framing that
needs to be understood in order to determine which security controls
are likely to be e ective as a form of protection, and which elite security
framings need to be adjusted.
The binaries upon which much of technological security are grounded
are di cult to apply in the complexities of the lived experience of
everyday life. Technologies and practices have di erent meanings in
di erent contexts, and what is deemed secure and insecure emerges from
those di erent meanings. Technological security viewed through the lens
of the everyday, lived experience is complex, riddled with contradictions
and a constant process of negotiation and exploration. The everyday
is not only about the certain practices and issues that are often not
typically regarded as political, but it can also be understood in a sensory
way. For example, French sociologist, Henri Lefebvre, highlights two
conceptualisations of the everyday: one that focuses on the rhythms
and cycles of our days and nights and natural world and one that
accentuates the routines work and consumption (Lefebvre and Levich,
1987). In this sense, the notion of everyday is linked to the idea of
repetitive, mundane practices, and is also embedded in the idea of
rhythm and routine which can be used to connect systems in everyday
life. Such routines can of course be digitally-mediated and share and
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Security technologies mediate many of our day-to-day interactions
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protect information. Lefebvre goes on to explain that “[t]he everyday
can therefore be defined as a set of functions which connect and join
together systems that might appear to be distinct” (Lefebvre and Levich,
1987). This perspective makes visible spaces in which previously unseen
issues come to the fore and take on political meaning.
Security technologies control
access to our private spaces
In international relations, stud-
ies of the everyday include the polit-
ical agency of the non-elites or what
are sometimes termed “the common
people” (Guillaume and Huysmans,
2019). Security issues are framed in
terms of the personal (Guillaume
and Huysmans, 2019), and as a re-
sult factors that are not typically
part of any analytical frame - such
as gender, resistance, social and po-
litical capabilities - are revealed to influence not only the personal but
also the international.
One way of conceptualising an everyday perspective is that it looks
at an issue horizontally rather than vertically, or top-down (Guillaume
and Huysmans, 2019). Aligned to this, Bissell (2013) argues that the
everyday can also be understood in spatial terms by conceptualising
di erent types of connections: for example, a linear connection between
two points, such as an individual logging into a system, and a web
of connections that are made of up of small, routine interactions. In
digital terms, the web of connections is an important route to digital
access. This lens enables a view on an issue that unfolds through
everyday enactments and entanglements, and it is through this unfolding
that embodied responses to technology emerge. Security issues when
understood from this perspective are fleeting and emergent, and will
foreground and background as they form and re-form. This spatial
view is particularly important because it reveals the spaces around
interactions with technology, and it is in these spaces that securing
processes and practices, upon which the success of security controls are
contingent (Burdon and Coles-Kemp, 2019), take place.
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The everyday opens up the need for materialist-pluralist responses
where technologies support many types of security, again, some of which
might conflict. This perspective o ers a much clearer view of how people
engage with technology, and how technology aligns or conflicts with
everyday life. However, the perspective of the everyday does not fully
capture the embodied security experience. To achieve this, we need to
bring in an ontological security position.
4.4 Shifting Perspective to the Self
Social routines, identity and trust are important security mechanisms
Much of how individuals respond to everyday security issues is shaped
by an embodied and internalised sense of security. Ontological security
is the embodied sense of security that influences how security is felt and
experienced by an individual. It helps to shape our security practices,
and the ways we perceive security threats. As a result it is central to
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the way we understand digital security. Everyday security provides the
routines and repetition that help to foster an ontological security.
Security is also an embodied
experience
Ontological security manifests it-
self in the routinisation of life to
prevent it from tipping into chaos,
enabling individuals to have the con-
fidence to go about their daily activ-
ities. This understanding of security
as an experience and as a feeling is
connected to our understanding of
security practice. For example, non-
compliant practices are often rou-
tinised technological practices de-
signed to cope with complex and
unpredictable situations (Singh et
al., 2007).
Croft (2012), quoted by Croft
and Vaughan-Williams (2017), de-
scribes ontological security as fol-
lows: “the key elements of an on-
tological security framework are a
biographical continuity, a cocoon of
trust relations, self-integrity and
dread, all of which apply at the
level of the individual, and all of
which are constructed intersubjec-
tively”. Ontological security there-
fore manifests itself in the every-
day practices designed to build and
maintain routines that enable an in-
dividual to benefit from social forms
of security, such as trust relationships, and to cope with complex and
uncertain situations. This calls for a broader conceptualisation of trust,
one that builds on sociological understandings of trust as a “social
reality” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985) where trust is established partly
through routines (Mollering, 2006).
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Ontological security is strengthened not through controls and tech-
nologies but through acts of care. Care creates conditions in which
trust can be reproduced by recursively enacting social practices across
space and time, and it enables people to integrate systems into their
everyday lives. Care can be broken down into: recognising a need for
care; caring for, i.e. taking responsibility to meet that need; care giv-
ing, i.e. the actual physical work of providing care; and, finally, care
receiving, i.e. the evaluation of how well the care provided had met
the caring need. Nevertheless, issues can still arise “from conflicting
responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its
resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than
formal and abstract” (Tronto, 1993, p. 78). This gives an alternative
start point for thinking about security technologies. Care as a start
point for a digital security approach is considered by Kocksch et al.
(2018) when re-framing technological security as careful practices of
collaborative tinkering and experimentation. In this paper they argue
that IT security is an enmeshed bundle of both care and cure practices,
but that the care work is often invisible and badly rewarded, and yet
without it, IT security strategies are unlikely to be successful (Burdon
and Coles-Kemp, 2019).
It is this contextual and narrative form of security that researchers
found when in the field during VOME. It is one that positions a
materialist-dualist ontology within a wider, more inclusive and more
accessible idealist-pluralist security position.
4.5 Concluding Comments
The three perspectives presented in this chapter are interconnected and
together they provide explanations as to why technological security is
experienced in the ways that it is. From a top down perspective, security
provides stability, reliability and consistency in the order and structures
that are used to protect states, society and technology. However, when
people conduct their lives in a digitally-mediated society, whilst the
top down structures of security o er stability, the top down view does
not address the challenges when di erent forms of security interact
with each other. To achieve this requires a means of identifying the
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intersectional security issues in the context of people’s everyday lived
experience and of developing contextual and narrative forms of security
that can lead the response to those issues. Theories of everyday security
and ontological security help to bring these intersections into view, and
open up the space for a contextual and narrative form of security that
takes place in the social spaces around technological interaction.
In the next chapter, Digital Civics, a branch of Human-Computer
Interaction, is examined as one frame through which a contextual and
narrative form of security can be unpacked and further developed. This
frame is also complemented by the view from the Practice paradigm, to
see how a focus on practice shines a light on the intersections between
securities, and identifies a broader form of technological security at work
in those intersections.
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Digital Civics, A Practice-Lens and Digital
Security
Digital civics connects
technology to a wider
social context
Our projects have always shone a
light on the fact that whilst tech-
nological security is focused on the
protection of data and technology,
this does not necessarily secure the
people who use the technology as
they go about their everyday lives in
a digitally-mediated society (UKRI,
2020). Political and social theories
of security introduce many more
forms of security, o er a variety of
approaches to respond to security
issues and present di erent ways
of constructing security problems.
Shifting perspective to the everyday
lived experience, it becomes clear
that the security challenges that
people focus on are an enmeshed
composition of many forms of secu-
76
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rity. For example, when working with families separated by prison, we
discovered that the question of information access in the context of
family support services are often bound up in the wider challenge of
managing the relationship with the individual in prison. The groups
that we worked with on this project managed and maintained this
relationship through the prison visiting journey; the support services
and the concomitant information sharing and protection practices were
understood as part of the wider challenge of maintaining the security
of family relationships.
Community capacity building is
at the heart of digital civics
Understanding how people iden-
tify and respond to issues in a
digitally-mediated setting is core
to Human Computer Interaction
(HCI). For example, the study of dig-
ital civics, a form of HCI with a par-
ticular focus on the socio-economic-
political processes at work in digital
settings, together with the study of
practices in and around technology
within a setting, help us to better
understand why digital technology
is used in the ways that it is. In this
chapter, we show how a wider lens
on technology use illuminates how
people use a wide range of sociotech-
nical resources, networks of power
and information sharing and protec-
tion practices to respond to security
issues in their everyday lives. This
wider lens brings a number of the
concepts and themes that appear in
social and political theories of secu-
rity into direct conversation with the design of digital services and prod-
ucts. For example the social contract, the protection of the state, digital
protection as a human right and marginalised voices are all germane to
understanding the di erent security dimensions of a digitally-mediated
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
78 Digital Civics, A Practice-Lens and Digital Security
socio-economic-political setting. In connecting technological security
to this wider sociotechnical perspective, a digital security paradigm
emerges to give a more complete understanding of what it means to
both be secure and practice security in a digitally-mediated setting.
The digital civics agenda advocates technologies that support di er-
ent forms of civic engagement and process (Olivier and Wright, 2015;
Taylor et al., 2015; McCarthy and Wright, 2004; Asad et al., 2017;
Puussaar et al., 2019). Olivier and Wright (2015) in their introduction
to digital civics highlight the importance of designing for citizens rather
than for consumers. In making this move from consumers to citizens,
Olivier and Wright bring to the fore debates about the impact of digital
research and practice on people and also on the place in which they
live, work or visit. They use the term digital civics to refer to research
and practice that uses digital technologies to empower people and set
out three key objectives for digital civics:
• Create relational rather than transactional public services.
• Create a model of citizen-led service commissioning.
• Develop long-term engagements with a full range of stakeholders
to build relational models of public services.
Digital technologies can support
relational services
Whilst the notion of civics and the
idea of digital empowerment is not
without its challenges, as a body
of work digital civics scholarship is
one means of recognising how people
identify and mobilise responses to
security issues in their everyday lives
and acknowledging a much broader
canvass of security actions.
The digitalisation of government
services has become a prominent means of service provision and is in-
creasingly becoming the point at which individual and state meet. Many
public services are now digital by default. In the UK, this transformation
began in 2012 when the UK Government launched a Digital-by-Default
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initiative to bring government departments and several hundred public
body under one website, www.gov.uk (McLoughlin and Wilson, 2013;
HMG, 2012). The aim was to create a single point of access for many of
the government services such as registering to vote, applying for driving
license, and claiming welfare (HMG, 2019). Initially a strategy framed
as one of promoting citizen choice, in the era of austerity, also provided
a means of cost savings through the reduction of face to face support
and the re-design of services.
Technological security forms an important part of the digital by
default story, as it is the main means through which government services
identify people accessing services and the means through which access
to public resources are controlled. At the same time, such technology
also regulates access to services that are important for the safety and
well-being of individuals and communities as well as contributing to an
individual’s economic, social, employment, food and personal securities.
5.1 Technology Through a Political and Social Lens
Digital civics is a cross-disciplinary area of research and practice (Vla-
chokyriakos et al., 2016) and its focus is technology use as part of
civic engagement and civic responses to issues. There are many actors
involved in civic engagement and these include organisations, groups
and individuals contributing to the response. Digital civics is sometimes
cast as a synthesis of studies in community informatics, digital democ-
racy and smart cities (Asad et al., 2017). It is described as having two
components: a turn to participatory systems and a focus on relational
interaction (Corbett and Le Dantec, 2018a). It also shares a sense of
inclusivity and attends to the issues of groups that are typically over-
looked in technology design. For example, Schorch et al. (2016) examine
the issues and possible responses for elderly informal caregivers, a group
that is typically not designed for and whilst Müller et al. (2012) have
attended to the issues experienced by elderly residents in care homes.
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Civic responses to issues have the following properties (Le Dantec,
2016):
• civic responses cross many boundaries, blurring the roles of actors;
• projects or products that must meet the expectations of a diverse
and fluid range of actors;
• demands at all levels of production, distribution, reception and
control.
These complexities add another dimension to security responses. Whilst
the engineering and technology design approaches outlined in the previ-
ous chapter are still necessary to develop and deploy technologies that
are reliable, the technologies are deployed in open systems with the
complexities described above. Relational services are services that are
based on methods of relationship building and are one means of flexibly
responding to these complexities. Open systems are woven together
through everyday rhythms and routines and rely on relational services
and interactions that re-cast the projects and products in di erent lights
depending on the issues at hand. Relational services encourage positive
forms of security grounded in trust and collaboration.
Relationship building re-cast products and services in di erent lights
Digital civics has a broad agenda that encompasses a number of di erent
areas of scholarly focus. However, woven through the agenda is the theme
of supporting, sca olding and building capacity within communities
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to respond to lived issues through the use of technology (Peacock and
Al-Shahrabi, n.d.). Following from this, four key areas of scholarly focus





These di erent areas of focus are interwoven and whilst a study may
focus on, for example, issues of trust, the relational design of processes
and community engagement practices will also be present in the study
setting and findings. Similarly the idea of publics which is the formation
of a multi-stakeholder group of individuals that are connected through
trust relationship and that, as a group, identify and respond to issues.
In the following sections, these areas of scholarly focus are unpacked.
It is important to note that, like technological security, digital civics
blends theory and academic inquiry with practice. As is often the
case with security studies, the digital civics community is composed of
academic and non-academic stakeholders. As a result, this monograph
refers to digital civics as both scholarship and practice.
5.1.1 Relational Design
Central to the understanding of digital civics is the shift from transac-
tional service models to relational service models (Vlachokyriakos et al.,
2016; Olivier and Wright, 2015). A digital civics perspective contends
that it is the relations rather than the transactions that contribute most
to civic life (Asad et al., 2017). By configuring service models to focus on
relational forms of service, the aim is to change the power relationships
between people, communities and the state. Transactional services in
the context of digital services foreground an exchange between citizens
and state, where governmental agencies and authorities request specific,
pre-determined information in return for a public service defined by the
government.
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In contrast, relational services are those that are based on methods
of relationship building that are used to respond to problems defined
by the service community (users and providers) as a whole. Muir and
Parker (2014) point out that many public services are responding to
complex social problems and require both transactional and relational
services to meet the needs of people. Relational services are used to de-
termine people’s needs and develop the capabilities necessary to benefit
from transactional services. In HCI, a relational focus might include,
for example, digital tools that can support individuals to envision, cam-
paign for and produce responses to particular issues (Vlachokyriakos
et al., 2016). Associated with this focus on a relational approach is an
acknowledgement that relational services have di erent economic mod-
els underpinning them and can build a connection between the service
and the place in which they are envisioned, produced and deployed.
Relational services reconfigure power relationships
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5.1.2 Community Engagement
Allied with a relational approach is the design and execution of commu-
nity engagement. Community engagement has many modes of execution
so that the engagement process is able to adapt and survive the often
rapid and unpredictable changes to municipal organisations (Asad et al.,
2017). An important aspect of digital civics is therefore to develop meth-
ods and processes of engagement that enable communities to set-up and
sustain meaningful engagement in order to bring about positive change.
To achieve this, community engagement processes need to engender
empathy and understanding rather than determine what an engagement
is or how it is to be achieved (Asad et al., 2017).
Studies of community engagement have shown that the use of technol-
ogy is diverse (Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012) and typically uses re-purposed
everyday technologies (Lovejoy and Saxton, 2012; Asad et al., 2017;
Le Dantec, 2012). For example, Lopez et al. (2012) show that non-
profits use microblogging technologies such as Twitter to great e ect.
The work identified that microblogging was used by not-for-profits for
three reasons: information sharing, community building, maintenance,
and action. The work showed that microblogging was used in four
ways for community building and maintenance: giving recognition and
thanks, acknowledgement of current events, responses to public reply
messages, and public response solicitations. Le Dantec (2012) reveals
similar categories in a study of participation and use of an online mes-
sage board. Such studies also show that community engagement is a
means of building social capital which can be defined as “the value
derived from being a member of a society or community” (Huysman,
Wulf, et al., 2004, p. 1) and this social capital helps to build stronger
community engagement.
5.1.3 Trust
Relational services and community engagement are a means of engender-
ing and maintaining trust relationships and building social capital. The
design of these approaches has to take into account levels of mistrust
and develop techniques to operate in spaces where there is an absence
of trust (Corbett and Le Dantec, 2018a).
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Digital civics foregrounds trust
Trust therefore is a key theme in
digital civics research. Digital civics
places emphasis on dialogue, em-
powerment and participation, but
distrust often characterises the re-
lationships that these activities are
designed to develop (Corbett and
Le Dantec, 2018a). Therefore, trust
building and trust maintenance in relationships between stakeholders in
community engagement is a dominant theme in digital civics research
and practice. The focus of this work is to support trust in community
engagement. Trust or its absence plays a crucial role in civic engage-
ment (Asad et al., 2017; Crivellaro et al., 2014; Corbett and Le Dantec,
2018a; Harding et al., 2015).
Corbett and Le Dantec (2018a) identified four main strategies for
supporting trust building and maintenance in digital civics:
• Historicizing engagement: Barriers to engagement come from
events in the past and identifying these experiences is important
for understanding a particular trust assessment.
• Focusing on experience: Building trust within the community
engagement process can be adversely a ected by negative past
experiences of engagements.
• Mediating expectations: Creating an expectation that community
benefit will be realised, despite uncertainty and challenges helps
to build trust.
• Preserving institutional relationships: Personnel churn in institu-
tions and constant organisational restructuring is a key challenge
to maintaining trust, and therefore it is important to design ways
and means of preserving relationships with those institutions.
Each one of these strategies has a direct impact on how people experi-
ence security technologies and provides ways of examining why some
people have negative experiences. The implications of mistrust are also
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important to highlight because often the challenges that a digital civics
approach responds to arise because of pre-existing mistrust conditions.
For example, technological controls, such as those used to facilitate
digitalised welfare programmes, might serve to highlight the mistrust
the state might feel towards the claimant.
5.2 Digital Civics and Publics
The notion of publics is often deployed in digital civics to structure a
technological approach in complex environments with multiple stake-
holders. Publics are a diverse group of stakeholders bound by common
issues (Le Dantec, 2012). The American philosopher John Dewey (Dewey
and Rogers, 2012) argued that a public does not pre-exist but is formed
when multiple stakeholders identify and express a common concern
and then work together to respond that concern. The issues that are
identified and responded to cross stakeholder boundaries and involve
working together to successfully respond to the issue. HCI scholar Le
Dantec (2012) argues that the Deweyan notion of publics is highly
relevant to the design of interactive technologies because it involves the
identification of issues that a ect multiple groups and communities and
require collaborative working.
The shift towards the construction of technology through the lens of
publics and away from a focus solely on technology as a product is an
important one because it puts a focus on the engagement throughout the
life cycle of a product, and not only concentrates research and practice
on current use but also future use (Le Dantec, 2012). Publics are made
up of three elements: attachments, issues, and infrastructure (Le Dantec,
2016). Attachments are a bonding of actors, artefacts and institutions.
Attachments are inherently conflicted, for example sharing information
vs. hiding information, making information open and accessible vs. reg-
ulating access to information. Dependencies and commitments form an
attachment and are a means of responding to particular issues. Publics
marshal social and technical resources to respond to issues and this
marshalling is termed “infrastructuring”. When addressing design-in-use,
i.e. the ways in which a product’s meaning and use is adjusted through
the process of use, infrastructuring is a key concept. Infrastructuring is
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the appropriation of technical and social infrastructures to develop and
sustain the response to an issue (Le Dantec, 2012). Through the process
of infrastructuring, publics are constituted and refined (Le Dantec,
2012).
Infrastructuring brings together many stakeholders
Digital civics literature often acknowledges that developing and sustain-
ing a response to an issue can be conflicted (Crivellaro et al., 2015),
and attachments can be developed through contestation as well as goal
and value alignment. The process of infrastructuring is also important
in this respect because stakeholders are not fixed and institutional
stakeholders often change (Asad et al., 2017). This churn might be in
terms of personnel but at the institutional level might also be in terms
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of a change in policy direction or in policy constraint. This fluidity and
change can result in adjustments to goal and value alignment within
stakeholder groups and can lead to contestation and friction between
stakeholder groups. Publics are therefore dynamic, living groups that
require on-going and adaptable forms of community engagement.
The concept of publics is useful for understanding the wider space
in which security issues are responded to. Identifying how attachments
are formed, who and what are included in an attachment and the
information that flows through an attachment is an important means
of understanding how security issues are framed and where security
knowledge is created. Security responses will largely take place as part
of infrastructuring rather than in the direct interaction between an
individual and a digital service as this is where securing processes and
activities take place.
5.3 Digital Civics and Security
Issues of security are threaded explicitly and implicitly through the
projects linked to the study of digital civics. The digital civics agenda
has largely concentrated on issues of safety and security through the
lens of trust (Corbett and Le Dantec, 2018b; Le Dantec, 2016). However,
the political meanings of security technologies have also been examined
by Castro Leal et al. (2019) where the ambiguities of technology in a
guerilla warfare setting were analysed and collective, social responses
to the emergent risks presented.
Whilst security technologies play a vital role in ensuring the relia-
bility of digital technologies and services, trust and resilience are built
through the social elements of infrastructuring and in the bonds that
are formed between stakeholders to respond to security issues. Digital
civics creates a lens through which security practitioners and researchers
can both explore and work with these spaces around the technology to
develop more contextual and narrative forms of security that supports
and includes people in security action.
The lens of publics opens up many more opportunities for the
deployment of security interventions, and for the design of security
responses that blends di erent security logics and ontologies. For ex-
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ample, an idealist-pluralist framework for security might be introduced
into the community engagement processes and the design of the rela-
tional services. Equally, if technologies are understood as a constellation
of products rather than as individual products, the technologies as a
constellation might o er many more ontological combinations.
Digital civics o ers multiple
security views
The digital civics focus on the
identification of issues and the for-
mation of responses to those issues,
aligns with a social constructionist
approach to security that both re-
orders the security issues and also
critically challenges the security is-
sues regarded as legitimately requir-
ing responses.
By examining technological security through the lens of digital
civics, the politics of security, and therefore security technologies, are
also foregrounded. This is because at the heart of digital civics is the
use of the digital to re-design the relationship between people and the
state. With the digitalisation of services and, more fundamentally, the
means by which the state communicates both within its borders and
outside its borders, technological security as a practice has indeed been
reshaped partly because securities that were once distinct and separate
are brought together. This gives rise to a new security paradigm, a
digital security that through an understanding of security practices
connects technological security to a broader range of social and political
securities.
Technological security is thus no longer about solely protecting
technology designed for a restricted purpose with restricted meaning,
but is now called upon to protect both the technology and the people
who use that technology in a seemingly infinite number of contexts
and for a limitless number of purposes. An approach to security that is
technologically mediated and that acknowledges the economic, political
and social dimensions of securing, is termed digital security, denoting
this more expansive form of technological security.
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5.3.1 The Practice Paradigm
Implicitly, digital civics places an emphasis on practices of information
sharing and protection but these practices are also embedded in the
discourses of trust, infrastructuring and publics. However, to under-
stand the securities at work in digitally-mediated situations, a Practice
paradigm can be used to examine how information is shared and pro-
tected in these settings. Practices are for digital security scholars one
of the main hinges through which security technologies are connected
to the broader sociotechnical, political and economic complex that is
the focus of digital civics thinking.
Kuutti (2013) described practices as relatively stable performances
that enable things to get done. There are numerous schools of thought
on what constitutes practice but Nicolini (2012) identifies five common-
alities of practice theory:
• Practice view on life.
• The critical role of materiality of human bodies and artifacts.
• Roles for both agency and actors that di er to the roles played in
traditional theories.
• Understanding knowledge as a capability not simply as something
that is transferred from one person to another.
• Centrality of interests and motivation in all human action and
they shape and influence the focus of power in those actions.
These ways of understanding practice create a lens through which
information sharing and protection practices can be examined. This lens
enables security scholars to bring together the materiality of security
technologies with the doing of security. It also enables a means of
connecting the processes of securing with the materiality of protection.
This is because it provides a means of identifying and theorising about
the creation of shared goals, orderings of values and the embodied
reactions to an access control system. Schmidt (2014) summarises
practice as the unity of the capacity to make and act.
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Using a practice lens opens up the surface of analysis. This is because
the study of practices emphasise the fabric of action, the knowledge and
reasoning that surrounds the action and the context in which it takes
place (Castellani 2009). The surface of analysis also situates practice
within a temporality. Kuutti and Bannon (2014) put forward that the
study opens up the surface of analysis still further by acknowledging:
• Practices are situated in time and space.
• Practices are dependent on the surrounding material and cultural
environment.
• Material and cultural environment are woven into the practice.
By harnessing a practice focus to digital civics, a detailed picture
emerges of how and why people conceptualise digital security in the
way that they do. From this understanding, information sharing and
protection actions become something that can be both theorised and
engaged with.
5.3.2 Foregrounding Relational Forms of Security
It could be argued that the security goals of technological security
controls causes technologists to focus on exclusion, control and mistrust
when designing technological systems (Gürses et al., 2016; Coles-Kemp
et al., 2018). It could also be argued that technological controls might fur-
ther exacerbate mistrust. For example, phishing awareness programmes
that result in employers phishing their own employees to highlight the
dangers of phishing, can result in mistrust of the employer and fear of
technological controls in a work setting (Ashenden, 2016).
Positive security is as much about
listening as it is about action
Digital civics instead foregrounds
responses that are grounded in rela-
tional services that build and main-
tain numerous forms of trust. A re-
lational service focus o ers a form
of security that is more inclusive
and has its roots in notions of care,
trust and reciprocity. The relevance
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of this re-orientation is discussed by Kocksch et al. (2018) in the context
of IT security practice, where such professional practices are presented
as relational processes and practices.
The digital civics perspective with its focus on enablement is also
better aligned with a positive view of security. Roe (2008) presented
an overview of the two positions of positive and negative security. In
its positive conceptualisation, people live free from fear and enabled to
live their everyday lives. In its negative conceptualisation, people are
protected from harms. Positive security promotes a relationship with
digital technology and services that enables people to successfully go
about their day-to-day activities, conditions which are necessary for
technological security controls to be e ective. Trust is central to the
positive conceptualisation of security and is needed so that individuals
feel secure in their identities, secure in the relationships that surround
them and secure in their environment.
Trust is central to e ective
technological security
Whilst usable security researchers
have long argued that trust is a
central component of e ective se-
curity (Flechais et al., 2005; Riegels-
berger et al., 2005; Kirlappos et al.,
2014), the focus has primarily been
on trust in the technology. Central
to this is the understanding that the
relationship between trust and con-
fidence, and knowing when to pro-
mote either or both, is an important
element of interaction design. Kiran and Verbeek (2010) argue that
confidence takes the form of people trusting themselves in their ability
to use technology and to take part in technologically-mediated interac-
tion. Yet this confidence can be hard to find where advice is conflicted
and di cult to follow (Renaud, 2011; Renaud et al., 2018). Sociologist
Luhmann (2000) di erentiates between the concepts of trust, familiarity
and confidence. In this sense, trust is the decision to engage in the
face of perceived risk, whereas confidence takes place where actions are
executed under the assumption that expectations will be met. Famil-
iarity, on the other hand, results in actions taking place as a form of
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routinisation. However, understanding these distinctions in the context
of digital interaction is complex and contested as Web Science studies
highlight, and therefore trust cannot simply be produced “by creating
the right tools and technologies” (Berners-Lee et al., 2006, p.89). This
is particularly true in the case of security technologies as technological
security is the seam through which the security interests of the state
and other institutions of power come into direct conversation with the
security of the individual.
Therefore, trust in the institutions of power, as well as trust in the
providers of the technology and services on behalf of those institutions,
play a significant role in whether security technologies are trusted or
not. Knowles and Hanson (2018) undertook a study with older adults
and concluded that articulating distrust in a technology or system was a
shorthand for a wider disagreement with the values represented by that
system. In this case, distrust took the form of resisting behaviours and
disengagement behaviours as a means of articulating this disagreement
with the values represented by the system.
The work of Knowles and Hanson (2018) highlights the importance
of recognising the relevance of value alignment when understanding
digital practices, including security practices. A trust-led, participa-
tory approach that uses relational services to build and maintain trust,
align values of stakeholders with the values of a system and use en-
gagement processes to respond to value clashes are what Smith (2005)
describes as securing processes (Burdon and Coles-Kemp, 2019). Se-
curing is also an important aspect of positive security and relies on
relational services, which are services that foreground human–to–human
interaction (Cipolla, 2009).
5.4 From Technological Security to Digital Security
Digitalisation complicates our understanding of how technological se-
curity might work in a digitally-mediated society by simultaneously
redefining the social, political and economic structures upon which
technological security relies, at the same time as demanding new forms
of technological security and new ways of thinking of technological
security practice.
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The digital civics agenda invites security scholars to use a practice
lens to consider security through a relational model that is trust-led, and
where issues are not pre-defined but are identified as part of community
engagement and where stakeholder groups form clusters around issues.
This way of thinking about technology and how it relates to people is
very di erent from the more solution-oriented approach to technological
security. The digital civics agenda creates spaces in which stakeholder
groups are empowered to identify security issues, and to use their
social networks and a blend of social and technological infrastructures
to respond to those security issues. This form of issues-led security
requires the development and nurturing of trust relationships between
stakeholders and the use of social bonds and the development of social
capital to resolve some of the security challenges that emerge when
responding to civic issues.
Table 5.1: Comparison of technological and digital security







As Table 5.1 summarises, technological security is led with a negative
security (protective) focus, placing a security emphasis on transactional
services related to information access and responding to pre-defined
security problems. Whereas digital security is led with a positive security
(enablement) focus, placing a security emphasis on the relational support
provided by social networks and responding to issues that emerge as a
result of community engagement. A focus on practices and the complex
ways in which practices create complex sociotechnical constellations
to respond to security issues generate granular and more complete
understandings of what digital security is and how it might be shaped.
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5.5 Concluding Comments
Developing a form of security that speaks to both social and techno-
logical securities, and where the intersections of these securities are
recognised, requires a security mindset that recognises security practices
that enable both positive and negative forms of security. Relational
processes work along these intersections and respond to issues identified
by stakeholder groups that form in response to issues and concerns.
Through the lens of practice and the wider sociotechnical perspective
of digital civics, a new form of sociotechnical security emerges that is
relational, collaborative and ground-up. This is a form of security that
draws on social and political theories of security as well as technologi-
cal security design and practice. This is in fact a digital security that
supports the digital civics mission.
In the next chapter, digital security is presented as a practice-
based approach that is grounded in the participatory and democratising
practices of digital civics.
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Digital Security: Practice and Methods
Drawing on the engagement and practice principles found in digital
civics, this chapter sets out an approach and possible methods that can
be used to both practice and research matters of digital security. From
the VOME project onwards (UKRI, 2020), we realised that to observe
and understand the phenomena relevant to our research questions
required a form of research attentive to the context in which security
technologies were being used. We also realised that the phenomena
that we wanted to reach were not readily observable, and we needed to
develop ways of researching that encouraged our participants to guide
us to the phenomena, and explore them with us. In developing these
approaches, we discovered that we needed to develop a research and
engagement approach that moved us towards a more equal distribution
of power between researchers and participants, such that both sides
could trust each other to explore the unknown.
95
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Exploring the unknown together
The approach and methods set out in this chapter are grounded in
participatory design, design thinking and digital inclusion, and show
how using an approach not typically associated with security technology
design and practice reveals a di erent set of issues and ways of practising
security. We examine how a practice lens influences the design of an
engagement, and show how our methods can be used to illuminate
the information sharing and protection practices around and within
digitally-mediated interaction.
6.1 Contextual Design
Zurko and Simon (1996) demonstrated that understanding the social
aspects of HCI requires alternative research methods, and di erent
types of engagement. This work outlines the importance of contextual
design methods that o er a deep dive into people’s digital habits and
practices. Zurko and Simon (1996) draw from the work of Wixon et al.
(1990) on contextual design, which examines why traditional scientific
methods, often quantitative in nature, drawn from mathematics and the
mathematical sciences, “have failed to provide relevant information for a
number of the necessary elements of product development such as: needs
analysis, requirements definition and interface design” (Wixon et al.,
1990, p. 329). Wixon et al. (1990, p. 331) set out the basis of contextual
design being built on a form of contextual inquiry, one that collects data
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in partnership with technology users in the context of a person’s work.
In this context, contextual design is contextual work that incorporates
interpretation together with an understanding of technology, to develop
an understanding of people’s needs as a basis for technology design.
Methods of engagement shape
the interactions
The pioneers of contextual de-
sign in HCI argued that design prin-
ciples needed to be understood from
the perspective of the people using
the technology (Wixon et al., 1990,
p. 334). This argument is equally
true for the design of security tech-
nology and services, given that it is
important to understand how peo-
ple understand, experience and prac-
tice di erent forms of security in
digital contexts (Coles-Kemp and
Ashenden, 2012). This requires the
use of a range of qualitative re-
search methods which are similar
to the context design and inquiry
methods cited by the HCI usability
pioneers (Zurko and Simon, 1996;
Wixon et al., 1990). Dunn Cavelty
(2013) identified the importance of
considering how the methods of engagement shape the nature of the
interaction with research participants and, therefore, the types and
qualities of data that are elicited as a result.
Contextual technology design often attends to the values of the
intended user communities as well as to those of the technology or
service provider. Whilst following a value sensitive design approach is
relatively uncommon in security technology design, it has been proposed
on occasion. For example, Friedman et al. (2002) examined how value
sensitive design can be used in the design of informed consent controls
in the context of browser design. In this article they also argue that
informed consent is an important human value, but it can only be
realised in an on-line setting if browsers (and other interface technologies)
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implement technical mechanisms related to informing and obtaining
consent for information gathering and sharing.
Democratic forms of research participation is one of the distinc-
tive features of digital civics practice and scholarship. Participant en-
gagement in academic research is not often prominently featured in
research design (Arcury and Quandt, 1999; Chavez et al., 2017). Whilst
ethnographic studies have participant engagement techniques deeply
embedded into their research design, these studies are often peripheral
to the mainstream of many disciplines. Participant engagement is more
typically framed in terms of the representativeness of the participant
sample, or the demographic selected not in terms of the methods used
to achieve engagement or their impact on the quality or types of data
collected (Coles-Kemp and Stang, 2019).
The following sections set out some of the options available for
technology studies that focus on people and their use of technology
rather, than on technology and how people use it. The chapter then
moves to set out an approach to enables researchers and practitioners
to focus on the digital security needs of people; a creative security
approach.
6.1.1 User-Centred Design
Listening is a key research skill
Zurko and Simon (1996) highlight
the need for research and engage-
ment methods that work together
with people, rather than sepa-
rate from people. Participation is
thus central tenet of contextual de-
sign (Wixon et al., 1990). There are
various forms of people-centred de-
sign, ranging from user-centred de-
sign to participatory design.
User-centred design has become
a generally accepted approach in
technology design (Mattelmäki et
al., 2006). User-centred design aims
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to understand who the users are, what they do, and what kinds of
attitudes they may have. A lot of care and attention has to be given to
working with users in the right way, with the right methods, in the right
context and at the right time (Wensveen et al., 2000). Mattelmäki et al.
(2006) argue that there are three ways to engage with user experiences:
• Listen to users.
• Observe what they do.
• Encourage them to express what their aspirations and experiences
are.
Getting to know users and to understand the potential contexts in
which they use technology is often the start point for user-centred de-
sign (Wensveen et al., 2000). To do this, traditional qualitative methods
from social sciences are often called upon. These may include contextual
inquiry, observations, interviews, questionnaires and focus groups (Mat-
telmäki et al., 2006, p. 28). The more ephemeral the experience - or
the more precarious the environment and abstract the concepts - the
more careful the design of the engagement. Security is a particularly
challenging interaction to capture because security is both interaction
with technology, but also a felt experience, and the security meaning of
the interaction has to be understood in the context of the felt experience.
As a result, observation and discussion have limited success in deriving
the whole security experience. For this, we need to look at approaches
that create spaces in which people can articulate security as a felt
experience, as well as security as an interaction. One such approach is
participatory design.
6.1.2 Participatory Design
Whilst usable security has predominantly focused on people-centred
design, digital civics has adopted a people-centred approach that focuses
on not only the democratisation of technology, but also of the processes
used to design technology (not only at the time of initial design, but
also in-use).
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As Brandt (2006) explains, “[p]articipatory design implies active
involvement of the people designed for and other stakeholders in the
design work”. The author goes on to argue that participation is one of
the cornerstones of design. Ehn (2008) argues that by including people
who are being designed for in the design work, there is an attempt to
anticipate contexts of use that might emerge in people’s lived experience
before the actual use of the thing that is designed.
Participatory design is the active
involvement of people
Ehn (2008) also refers to meta
design as design-after-use, where de-
signers and future designers/users
envision and anticipate potential de-
sign after the initial artefact has
been produced. As Vines et al.
(2013) argues, these two forms of
design are often referred to using
the one term participatory design.
The term design thing refers to the
object of concern in design, the de-
sign object and its representatives
(the possibilities and concerns that
the design object represents) (Ehn, 2008). This term is particularly apt
for describing security technologies because the object of concern is a
form of security that is not necessarily fully represented by the design
object, and which requires an understanding of its representatives (for
example whilst a file permission might represent access to a file, it can
also represent access to a secret or to a document with considerable
emotional importance).
Both participatory design and meta-design are represented in digital
civics; participatory design because it creates spaces of empowerment
for potential users of technology to shape technology to respond to
the issues and aspirations of their lived experience, and meta-design
because it uses the process of infrastructuring to bring together current
and future designers and users.
Participatory research has an ever-increasing take-up in HCI re-
search (Vines et al., 2013). It is at the heart of digital civics research
and practice because it calls for a democratisation of the technology
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design process (Vines et al., 2013). Democratising technology does not
only mean increasing the roles, availability and accessibility of tech-
nology in everyday life, but also enabling di erent stakeholder groups
to enter into the conversation about where, how and why technology
is used (Le Dantec et al., 2010). Participatory design helps to achieve
these two democratising goals.
Participatory design democratises
research and practice
Participatory design has been
a particularly prominent feature of
digital civics when examining the
impact and design of digital prod-
ucts on the structures, practices and
experiences of public life (DiSalvo
et al., 2016). Participatory design
and, in particular, the innovation
of participatory processes and prac-
tices, are key to engaging communi-
ties who are at the margins of soci-
ety, and who may appropriate tech-
nologies in unanticipated ways (Le Dantec et al., 2010).
The humanities inspire
participatory research methods
It is for this reason that digi-
tal civics practice and research of-
ten draws on the humanities for
inspiration when, for example, de-
signing both the engagement pro-
cesses and materials (Schofield et
al., 2013; Rossitto et al., 2017; Dun-
phy et al., 2014). For similar rea-
sons, creative citizen technology ac-
tivities such as hackathons and DIY
citizenry activities have also been
deployed as forms of participatory
engagement (DiSalvo et al., 2014;
Shea, 2016).
Participatory design is an approach that is able to engage with a
wider range of technology users, often able to reach those who are not
typically able or willing to engage on the topic. Participatory design
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deploys methods and creates spaces in which people are able to reflect
on their experiences and articulate their felt experience of working with
technologies. However, security technology also represents particular
security positions which, in turn, are a defence of a particular order of
values. Therefore, it is therefore important that practice and research
engagements on the topic of digital security are not only participatory
and inclusive, but also use techniques that enable the critical exami-
nation of the values that the security technologies represent. This is
because the values represented by the security technologies engender
particular security responses from those who use the technologies.
6.1.3 Practice Paradigm
The focus of these design approaches often falls on the design of tech-
nologies, or of the interactions that happen with these technologies.
However, there is typically less attention given to the practices that
happen around and between the technologies. This is the focus instead
of the Practice paradigm. Practices o er the opportunity to unite the
capacity to make and the capacity to act (Schmidt, 2014). This is par-
ticularly important to digital security because the security of a digital
interaction is rarely secured only in that moment, but is instead part of
a series of security actions that are bound into knowledge and reason,
and cultures and values. The practice focus leads us to examine how
technologies fit into our everyday practices (Kuutti and Bannon, 2014).
This is a significant insight because digital security technologies fit into
everyday practices, and digital security is not only understood as the
security technology, and the interactions with that technology, but as
part of a web of everyday security practices.
By looking through a practice lens, it is also possible to understand
technological security and security interactions from a temporal per-
spective given that practices are situated in time and space (Kuutti
and Bannon, 2014).
The Practice paradigm also acknowledges that practices are depen-
dent on the surrounding material and the cultural environment in which
they are situated (Kuutti and Bannon, 2014). The Practice paradigm
provides a means of bringing together security technologies with security
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theories, by asking practice-related questions that can be answered in
di erent ways from the di erent theoretical positions. This is because
practice enables an individual to adjust general principles and rules to
the particular conditions in which the principles and rules are to be
enacted (Schmidt, 2014).
The di erent theoretical positions in the security theory cannon
provide a di erent position from which to determine the following
questions that Schmidt (2014) set out when exploring practice:
• “How do they determine the conditions when certain practices
are to be used?”
• “How do they derive the most appropriate techniques for use in
practices?”
• “How do they decide when to deviate from the rules and form
new practices?”
• “How do they deal with breakdowns when practices no longer
work?”
Practices are dependent on
the surrounding material
The participatory and observational
techniques described in this chapter
can be focused on patterns of prac-
tice as the primary unit of analysis.
Participatory, material forms of en-
gagement, such as model building
and collage, can be used to uncover
how people determine which infor-
mation and sharing practices to use
and when, where, and at what point
those patterns of practice need to
be changed. Using a practice lens
enables researchers to identify the
information sharing and protection that happens in-between systems,
and is a perspective that links the internal, embodied forms of security
with practices of information sharing and protection in everyday life.
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This view not only makes visible the reasoning and logic that drive
the interactions and use of security technologies, but also the reasoning
that shapes those technologies in the first place. The perspective of
looking around and between technologies also means that a practice
lens is useful for identifying and understanding the interactions between
securities and how, through these interactions, a wider security practice
fabric is formed.
6.2 Critical Design
Digital civics not only draws on participatory processes in design, but
also encourages a critical design approach. This philosophy of critically
questioning the role of technology has been adopted as a central tenet in
critical design approaches. The essence of what makes design critical has
its roots in the Marxist notions of ideology and alienation where “the
basic idea is that dominant social classes maintain their dominance by
disseminating a system of myths presenting the status quo as natural and
good (this is ideology) which encourages the working class to buy into a
system that works against its own interest (this is alienation)” (Bardzell
and Bardzell, 2013).
Bardzell and Bardzell conclude that the following makes design
critical:
• Perspective-shifting and holistic understandings: critical design
helps to encourage multi-perspectival understandings and accounts
of a problem, not to o er a singular truth.
• Theory as speculation: theories are used to challenge understand-
ings and encourage the consideration of di erent viewpoints rather
than to o er truth.
• A dialogic methodology: the focus of a critical design process
is not to enter into di erent types of engagement from which a
diverse range of meanings and experiences will emerge.
• Improvement of the public’s cultural competence: critical design
processes encourage people to look beyond the surface and to
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question the technologies and rationales that are presented to
them.
• Reflexivity: critical design processes must understand their limits
as well as recognise their involvement in social and political change.
A creative design approach is therefore one that o ers security technology
design a means of uncovering the tensions and contradictions in what
is both wanted and needed from digital security.
Using a critical design approach, we can also call into question what
security is being o ered, to whom and for what reasons.
Speculation is one potential form of critical design and might be
termed “representations of systems yet to come” (DiSalvo et al., 2016).
The creative arts have been used a key source of inspiration for this
redesign, and are often included in such methodological innovation,
drawing on techniques such as theatre, film-making and collaging. Such
techniques are not only an aesthetic inspiration for the development of
research methods to encourage increased participation, but also o er a
powerful means of critiquing the implications and impacts of potential
digital technology designs.
Creative arts play a key role in
critical design
Social theory scholar Foster
(2015, p. 1) explains that “the arts
enable an examination of the every-
day in imaginative ways that draw
attention to the cruelties and contra-
dictions inherent in neoliberal soci-
ety”. The critical dimension extends
participatory co-design and princi-
ples of contextual design and inquiry
by ensuring that the research asks
questions of the intentions of both
the digital technology design and its
deployment. Critical design is there-
fore an important means of ensuring that the critical security questions
of Smith (2005) are central to a security design activity.
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6.3 Creative Security Engagements
The VOME project developed a creative security approach to digital
security inquiry (Dunphy et al., 2014), which o ered a means of under-
standing security technologies as technologies embedded within a social
context.
Engaging with people in everyday
spaces
It became clear from the out-
set of the VOME project that the
standard user-centred design ap-
proaches of interviews, observation,
surveys and focus groups had a lim-
ited success with the groups that
VOME was working with. VOME
initially started out by working
with a user-centred approach, but
in order to reach marginalised and
under-served communities, the en-
gagement processes had to be re-
thought, and the basis on which
engagement took place had to be
democratised.
Redesigning the engagement on this basis meant that the balance
of power shifted from the researchers towards the participant groups
that the researchers were working with. As a result, a participatory
engagement process and design ethos was adopted by the project. The
shifting of the balance of power towards the groups VOME was working
with was important for the building of trust, and also to ensure that
security was being addressed in terms of the issues that resonated with
those groups.
6.3.1 Creative Security Philosophy
At its core, a creative security approach is a critical design engagement
that draws on participatory and user-centred methods, in order to
examine practices of information sharing and protection. Such practices
include the making of security technologies, as well as the actions of
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sharing and protection. Its focus is not the human computer interaction
or the design of security technologies, but the actions that take place in
the space around and between the interaction and the security technolo-
gies. By working through a Practice paradigm, we were able to connect
the security practices, interactions and technologies to the overarching
security narrative that shaped a particular context. Miettinen et al.
(2009) observed that the study of practice is not only about the present,
but also about how the practice in the present relates to the past and
to larger institutional complexes.
A critical position, along with a participatory design approach,
emerged as a result of the move towards democratising both the engage-
ment process and the notion of technological, and subsequently digital,
security. A critical approach examines technology and process starting
from the question: “security for whom?”. Critical security design encour-
ages practices and research that interrogate the assumptions, beliefs
and values underpinning security technology practice and design, with
a view to responding to emergent security problems in an innovative
way. The focus of critical design in the context of digital security it
to look below the surface of security problems and their technological
responses and to critically challenge what is being asked of security and
why. In answering this, we can also identify who the real beneficiaries
are and how they benefit. This also means that we can identify who
is dis-benefitted and at what cost to societal, individual, technological
and state security.
Critical security design inquiries designed for VOME took a number
of forms, including:
• Examining problems in security designs produced in the past.
• Co-development of technologies and responses for current security
problems.
• Speculative design technologies for future and emergent security
problems.
Creative security methods (Coles-Kemp, 2018) are designed to enable
the development of an understanding of the broader context in which
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information protection, sharing and production takes place. In particular,
the methods are designed to draw out the broader issues and objectives
that frame particular flows or systems of information. The participant-
led methods of engagement are deliberately broad and open-ended so
that participants can create a picture of their world, and in so-doing,
develop an understanding of the issues that relate to the production,
protection, sharing and curation of information in a particular context.
Di erent methods are used
to elicit security narratives
The focus of creative security
methods is to promote dialogue, col-
laboration, listening, innovation and
collective action in response to is-
sues of information sharing and pro-
tection. The methods come from a
tradition of participatory engage-
ment that encourages active par-
ticipation, encourages the identifi-
cation of common interests (rather
than re-enforcing di erences be-
tween people), and promotes design
responses that reflect and encourage
the strengths of a particular envi-
ronment. Creative security methods
encourage people to reflect on their
environment, the emotions they feel
when sharing and protecting infor-
mation, the constraints they experience, the pressures that they undergo,
as well as the actions and the tasks that they perform when generating
and sharing information. The methods encourage the use of colour,
imagery, shapes, textures and sound, as well as text, to reflect upon and
articulate the situations in which information is generated and shared.
6.3.2 Creative Security Methods and Principles
There is no prescribed set of methods that are used as part of creative
security engagements; any method that encourages creative thinking
and discussion about an aspect of security could be classified as a
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creative security method. The practice of creative security has revealed
time and time again that the materials that are used and the way in
which they are used must be appropriate and meaningful to the group
using them.
There are, however, a number of methods that we have used in
the course of our work that have proved particularly successful engage-
ment and data gathering methods. These methods are described in the
following paragraphs.
Ceding control to participants
is fundamental to the approach
Collaborative wall collage: uses
the form of the wall collage and it
was first developed for creative se-
curity engagement on the VOME
project by (Coles-Kemp and Stang,
2019). Open questions, statements
and stimulus material are used to
encourage participants to produce
their own responses to a particular
theme. The responses are both writ-
ten and pictorial, and can also be
audial. The responses are created
as a wall collage where participants,
not researchers or security practi-
tioners, produce the content and have full editing rights. The output
is a meta-narrative from a group of people about a particular security
topic.
Current experience comic strip: uses a form of storyboarding com-
bined with the use of pre-prepared icons and the technique of doodling.
It was first developed for creative security engagement by Makayla
Lewis on the CySeCa project (Lewis, Coles-Kemp, et al., 2014). Open
questions and statements are used to encourage participants to think
about and communicate everyday experiences in a particular aspect of
security. Participants are provided with icon sets as well as art material
with which to illustrate their responses. The output is an individual
narrative about a particular security topic.
Physical modelling: this is a narrative method that uses physical
modelling as the main medium for storytelling. It was first developed
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for creative security engagement by Claude Heath on the TREsPASS
project (Hall et al., 2015). Open questions and statements are used to
encourage groups of participants to build an everyday security narrative
in a physical modelling tool such as LEGO. As part of the model
building process participants are encouraged to discuss and reflect upon
the security issues and the potential security responses. The output is a
group narrative about a particular security topic.
To try to keep the approach as open and supportive as possible,
creative security engagements are grounded in four participative princi-
ples:
• Cede control to the participants to create a form of engagement
where participants are able to negotiate the terms on which the
research takes place.
• Make visible all collected data by participants, displaying the
data in open spaces, so that participants both develop a sense
of ownership of the data, and have access to the data to make
subsequent changes.
• Carry out the research and engagement in a space that participants
routinely frequent in their everyday activities.
• Engender a participative environment that encourages participants
to envision positive change to a particular aspect of their everyday
working environment.
These principles have been found to shift the power towards the groups
taking part and away from the practitioners or researchers (Coles-Kemp
and Ashenden, 2012). Designing these principles into each engagement
encourages spaces where people are able to share their experiences of
everyday security concerns, build trust both in each other, develop
their own understandings of what security means, and where people
feel able to be part of changes that resolve security concerns not just
for individuals but for groups of people.
As can be seen, the creative security engagement approach has many
parallels with the approaches used in digital civics, and contributes to
The version of record is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/1800000030
6.4. Using Security Theories as Design Inspiration 111
the wider canon of participatory design engagement that draws from
the creative arts.
6.4 Using Security Theories as Design Inspiration
A creative security approach can be used to develop an understanding of
the context of use, and the securities at work, in a given situation. They
also provide an approach in which people can collaborate to identify the
security issues that are important in their everyday lives. Crucially, such
an approach also identifies the much broader canvas of sociotechnical
networks that combine to secure people in a digital context. For example,
Coles-Kemp and Jensen (2019) demonstrate how access to digitalised
refugee resettlement services is primarily a question of the benefits that
can be realised through accessing these services, and that access is both
enabled and protected through wider access to a network of social and
technical resources.
Playful challenging of design assumptions
Creative security engagements produce narratives of security which
contain di erent forms of security – both social and technical. Under-
standing wider social and political theories of security provides a broader
set of analytical tools with which to unpack the security narrative and
experiment with di erent security strategies. For example, competing
security goals of di erent stakeholders might be identified, multiple lived
experiences or real worlds might be identified, contrasting notions of
strength and vulnerability might come to the fore, and di erent security
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perspectives might be revealed if the narrative is told by the state,
society or the individual.
Creative security tools can also be used in a more speculative manner,
by using security theories as a provocation to challenge the narrative of
security technology design, to examine its security impacts in current
usage, and to imagine alternative futures with di erent security out-
comes. Our methods are playful and creative to encourage experimental
thinking about security possibilities and futures.
One approach to helping security technology designers to shift
perspective is to use social and political theories of security to change
the “start point” or assumptions about the design. For example, a
scenario might be viewed from the perspective of:
• Di erent security logics where a scenario might be viewed using
both positive and negative security positions, or from the perspec-
tive of a di erent site of security, and by swapping a universalist
for a contextualised security position (or vice versa).
• Di erent types of security thinking could be embodied in design
personas so that security technology designers, for example, could
adopt a persona that embodied a realist position, and another one
could adopt a persona that embodied a feminist security position.
• Di erent security strategies with their roots in di erent theory
positions: for example an attack-defence strategy or a collaborative
strategy.
These di erent, theory inspired techniques, could be used to build and
re-build scenarios to assess which security strategy and design approach
to deploy in a given scenario, for the best e ect. An approach that
encourages experimentation in this way can use other provocations, and
bring in other ways of seeing and thinking, to encourage and welcome
new forms of security thought and practice.
6.5 Concluding Comments
This chapter has presented a participatory, inclusive approach to identi-
fying digital security issues, and co-designing responses to them. The
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approach enables the identification of the di erent securing processes
as well as the security technology. It also brings clearly into view the
sociotechnical networks in which elements of the digital security prac-
tice take place. The next chapter sets out three worked examples that
represent a digital security approach.
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Security technologies have to
protect both people and technology
A digital security approach does not
replace or ignore technological se-
curity principles. Those principles
are essential to the reliable, secure
technology upon which we all de-
pend. However, digital civics schol-
arship and a Practice paradigm o er
a means of understanding techno-
logical security as being a part of a
wider digital security design - one
that resonates with the people it is
protecting, responds to their secu-
rity issues and, through negotiation and participation, and resolves
security issues. A digital security approach therefore has the twin goals
of protect and enable at its core.
In the projects that we have worked on (UKRI, 2020), every partici-
pant that we have worked with not only wants protection from digital
harms but also wants to use digital technology in a way that is free
from fear and that enables them to achieve their goals. To create digital
114
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environments in which these goals are met requires not only reliable,
secure technology, but also an understanding of the meanings of those
technologies for individuals and the patterns of information sharing and
protection practices that form around those meanings.
This chapter illustrates a digital security approach through the fol-
lowing three studies: digital security and service design, digital security
for all and digital security and professional security practice.
People want to be both protected
from harms and free from fear
Digital Security and Service De-
sign: in this study, stakeholders
worked together through a creative
security engagement to identify the
security issues that were relevant
for a micro-payments service. LEGO
was used to model the micro pay-
ments service situated within in-
tended sites of use. By modelling
the wider context of use, issues of
financial, ontological and organisa-
tional security came into view, and
responses were identified that re-
sponded to security at the inter-
sections between these securities
and technological security. The ap-
proach enabled participants to ex-
plore the potential webs of prac-
tice that might form in and around
the micro payments service. This
case study makes visible how the in-
tended technological controls within the micro payments service relate
to the security logic and practices of household security, financial in-
stitution security and service provider security (and the practices that
form to connect these di erent securities).
Digital Security For All: in this study, a group of welfare claimants
took part in a story telling activity within a focus group to examine
how security practices might form around a digital welfare service. The
study shows how when the conditions of a welfare policy are enforced
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through security technologies and the face to face support is removed,
the result can be a security policy that feels both harsh and unfair.
This in turn can lead to practices of resistance. The study also shows
that an e ective way to respond to such resistance is not to increase
the technological security of the service but to use relational services
and interactions to develop positive security around the service. This
case study makes visible how technological controls within the digital
welfare service relate to the wider security logic of social security and of
state security and the practices that form to resist these connections.
Digital Security And Professional Security Practice: in this study,
LEGO modelling is used to explore di erent approaches to controlling
the information generated by Internet of Things (IoT) monitoring in the
workplace. The LEGO modelling surfaced a risk-driven control approach
and a trust-driven issues-based approach. Using Smith’s four critical
security questions we identify the ways in which these two approaches
can be contrasted (Smith, 2005). This study shows that e ective security
practices require consensus as to what the security issues are and how
they should be responded to. The study also shows the importance of
agreeing the value and use of technology before embarking on security
responses to those technologies.
In each case study, we set out the use of security technologies within
the wider security landscape, examined the information sharing and
protection practices that are illuminated and reflected on how the wider
perspective helps us to see a more nuanced and multi-layered security.
7.1 Digital Security and Service Design
In this case study, we look at a digital security approach to service
design. This work was originally published in 2015 (Hall et al., 2015) as
a critical review of the way in which visualisation is used in technological
security practice.
7.1.1 Technological Security and the Wider Security Landscape
This case study is situated in a Small to Medium Enterprise (SME)
that specialises in the delivery of micro-payments services to small
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businesses and households. The micro-payments service was designed
use via Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). The goal of the study was
to identify which security controls were needed in the IPTV service,
how those controls would benefit the people using the service whilst still
meeting the regulatory requirements, and questioned under what social,
economic and political conditions those controls would be e ective.
Micro-payments are a useful means of financial management for
many households, particularly for those in lower socio-economic groups.
By combining micro-payments with technology such as a television that
is commonly found in a household, micro-payment technology becomes
more accessible. IPTV has a wide user-community demographic, and
the micro-payments service was particularly aimed at users without
access to, or distrustful of, computers and other smart devices. Given
the intended breadth of the user community, the service had to be
usable and accessible as well as secure.
For many micropayments are an everyday event
In this context of managing household finances, the people using the
service might be vulnerable to abuse of the system that might be carried
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out by other members of the community or from their own carers and
family. In this security landscape a number of di erent securities come
to the fore: security built on power and trust relations within households,
the importance of financial security to power and trust relations within
a household, and the relationship between the security view of the
regulators and the meanings of the security controls within a household
setting.
7.1.2 Physical Modelling and the Wider Surface Area
This study used a collaborative modelling approach based on participa-
tory design principles in order to gather the views of di erent stakeholder
groups. Participants were asked to model in LEGO central actors and
the infrastructures that were made and used to access micro-payment
services.
Creating a physical model that included the wider context of use
enabled a much broader discussion about the context in which the
service could be used. For example, modelling the service in this way
enabled a discussion about how the intended user community was remote
in many ways from those providing the service. The physical modelling
showed how the service provider was both physically distant and also
distant in terms of how they experienced very di erent pressures and
stresses to the ones likely to be experienced by many of the intended
service users.
The physical modelling also illuminated the extent of the sociotech-
nical infrastructure necessary to provide a micro-payment service that
was inclusive. In addition to the provision of technical and service
infrastructure, the modelling showed how third sector organisations
and community groups were important both to signpost families to
the service and to support families in setting up the service and using
it. Debt-support organisations and consumer rights groups were also
highlighted in the model as important aspects of the infrastructure
needed to support families in managing their finances and this support
would have a direct impact on service use. The model also showed the
di erent information flows across this infrastructure and discussions
were had as to how those information flows might be controlled.
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Pressures surrounding the context of use became visible
The physical modelling showed the potential power relations both
within families and within the neighbourhood and the types of in-
formation that was used to create and sustain those power relations.
The modelling highlighted how technical know-how might reside with
younger members of the household. The locus of technical know-how
in a family network might conflict with the need to control access to
information. It was discussed how the context of use was also shaped
by the pressures in which the di erent actors resided. For example,
financial pressures caused by unexpected bills might result in more
stressed interactions with the micro-payment service and less attention
being paid to security controls. Another example was given of how the
television was likely to be in a communal area and it might be di cult
for bill payers to have the necessary calm to make the payments. These
fluctuations and disruptions were all identified as points of vulnerability
for the micro-payment service user.
7.1.3 Reflections
The physical modelling exercise revealed the full design of the micro-
payment service and the sociotechnical infrastructures that interoper-
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ated to form the service. It revealed that what had been regarded as
a micro-payment service was in fact made up of a number of services
that were held together by a sociotechnical infrastructure composed of
technology, network connections and community groups. The modelling
exercise also created a space in which people could discuss the di erent
power relationships that might be at work and how these relationships
were shaped by cultural practices, the pressure landscapes in which the
di erent actors resided and the technical capabilities that actors might
have.
The threat landscape becomes
clearer
Once the extent of the ser-
vice was made clear, the extent
of the possible security challenges
also emerged. Examining the mod-
els of the possible sites of service
use, it also became clear how the en-
vironment might contribute to the
threats that service users could face.
For example, carrying out micro-
payments in a communal living area
introduces threats related to coercion by another family member, mas-
querading of legitimate users as the login process might be observed,
and accidental errors caused by accessing the service in a stressful,
chaotic environment.
The physical modelling exercise also revealed which values the
service was developed from and how those designing and delivering
the services understood the intended user community. This resulted
in a greater focus on building and developing trust with the intended
user communities and a greater focus on the support infrastructure for
those communities. This meant that the security that was foregrounded
was the security of social relations and the financial security of that
household. This in turn meant that the technological controls had the
focus of ensuring availability of the service and of enabling access.
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7.2 Digital Security For All
The work presented in this case study was first published in 2014 (Coles-
Kemp et al., 2014). The focus of the study is the implications of digi-
talised welfare. The original study revealed how technological security
controls in digitalised welfare were viewed by one group of participants
and how people respond when they perceive those controls to be hostile
to their individual security.
The study demonstrates the importance of designing a digital secu-
rity for all, and ensuring that the underlying political and social system
as well as the technological controls a ord security to the intended users
of that system.
7.2.1 Technological Security and the Wider Security Landscape
This was a small case study that was situated in an economically
deprived area of the North East of England where unemployment is
significantly higher than the UK’s national average. The focus of the
case study was to explore how the introduction of digital welfare services
might change attitudes towards information sharing and interaction
with representatives of the welfare services. At the time of the research,
Universal Credit (the UK’s digital-by-default welfare system) had not
been rolled out but welfare claimants were having to use various on-line
services as part of the welfare claiming process. In particular, welfare
claimants had to use on-line processes to log job seeking activities and
demonstrate compliance with the welfare claiming policy.
This case study connects the security of individuals with the social
security policy deployed through digital services and the protection of
the digital service.
7.2.2 Speculation and Practice
A small group of five participants discussed the impact of the digitalisa-
tion of welfare services. Three participants were long-term unemployed,
two participants were working in the third sector and two of these
participants received a disability living allowance. The participants were
members of a community group that provided digital welfare support.
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The participants walked through how they gain access to digital
services. In walking through how they access services, they used story-
telling to speculate about the types of resistance practices that might
emerge if people felt that the welfare services were unfair. During the
walkthrough, the participants also talked about how they felt when
accessing these services and the types of control that they believed they
had.
Digital access can be complex
The participants in the focus
group told speculative stories of fu-
ture digital welfare use that showed
little respect for the registration,
identification and verification pro-
cesses enforced through technolog-
ical security. Twisting the techno-
logical security controls to achieve
unauthorised or illicit outcomes was
sometimes presented as an act of
empowerment, sometimes an act of coercion and typically as an act
driven by financial need. The participants gave detailed examples of how
they would expect to be able to twist the system, where twisting meant
breaking or bending the welfare rules. It is striking that the participants
demonstrated a rich body of knowledge of how an individual might
subvert these processes and showed no respect for the technological
implementations of these processes. By contrast, the respect that was
shown emerged when talking about the face-to-face contact with welfare
o cers, which was a form of interaction that participants felt they were
less able to subvert.
7.2.3 Reflections
From a digital security perspective, this study underscores the rela-
tionship between security practices, security issues and the stakeholder
groups. The stakeholder group (welfare claimants) who took part in this
study perceived the digital welfare system as being a source of potential
harm. The result was a series of practices, called twists, that people
might invoke to counter the insecurities exacerbated by digital welfare.
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Digital by default can be alienating
The stories that the participants
told showed how these twists are in
part resistance practices that are
pushing back on welfare systems
that are regarded as hostile. The
analysis of the participants’ narra-
tives also indicate that standard
end-user system security techniques
of identification, verification, moni-
toring and surveillance do not result
in compliant behaviour from a user
community that contests the values
and the goals of the underpinning
service logic. This raises the impor-
tant question of how to make these
security controls more e ective in
such a scenario and, in particular,
how to adjust the sociotechnical in-
frastructure and social network that emerge around such services.
A potential point of security intervention, therefore, lies in the social
relationships that form around and between such digital services. The
participants’ narratives also underscore how technology and techno-
logical controls are enmeshed within social relationships. Adversarial
systems, as the participants felt digital welfare systems to be, often
result from poor relationships between the stakeholder groups and this
exacerbates adversarial security practices. The participants’ narratives
showed that security is repaired when stakeholder groups work together
to re-position the values and the goals of the system, and to develop
strategies that develop positive security to minimise the harms that can
result from interacting with the digital welfare system. This outcome
foregrounds the point that when a digital security lens is used, the
responses to security problems arising from the use of digital services
may well lie away from the technology use and in the relations into
which the use of services is situated.
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7.3 Digital Security And Professional Security Practice
This case study was first published in 2020 (Coles-Kemp et al., 2020b)
and it presented a study of two alternative approaches to identifying
and responding to the security issues that emerge from IoT monitoring
in the workplace. The study demonstrates the limits of technological
security and how a wider position is needed to respond to the security
issues that emerge at the intersections between technological security
and the security of people. The study also illustrates the limits of a
protection-led approach to security, and the possible benefits of blending
a protection-focused approach with an enablement-focused approach to
security.
7.3.1 Technological Security and the Wider Security Landscape
The context for this study was IoT monitoring in the workplace. This is
a context in which the security of people and the security of technology
are physically and technologically interwoven (Pierce, 2019).
The study presents two very di erent types of security practice in
the context of IoT monitoring in the workplace; one type of practice
was performed by security practitioners and the other by healthcare
service providers. The case study presented each group with an imagined
scenario of IoT monitoring. In the case of the security practitioners, the
use of IoT to monitor sta  was the given scenario. In the case of the
healthcare service providers, the use of IoT by patients to self-manage
health conditions was the given scenario. In this study, we wanted
to compare the approaches of both professional practice communities
might have towards this scenario and to explore what forms of digital
security might work in professional security practice.
A physical modelling approach was chosen as the main engagement
method. Each practitioner group used LEGO to model and discuss their
IoT in the workplace scenarios. The data was gathered, processed and
stored under ethical approval from the academic institution. Data was
generated in the form of physical models, annotations made by individual
participants, facilitator observations, notes of collaborative outcomes
from the brainstorming, and final group-feedback contributions.
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The data trails from monitoring technologies are extensive
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7.3.2 Establishing the Basis of Controls
The analysis showed the challenges that embedded technologies pose for
protection-focused technological security thinking. When information
production and circulation moves away from fixed points and becomes
embedded as part of day to day interactions, an approach based on
security perimeters is less e ective. The following themes were identified
from the analysis:
• Security Issues: Much of the response from the security practition-
ers focused on the inherent threat of not being in control. This
manifested itself in a sense of being overwhelmed with the volume
of data, and also of not being able to create a protected and stable
perimeter around the technology itself. This security issue arises
from a mismatch between security strategy and security threats
and highlights how vulnerabilities emerge when trust diminishes
in the capabilities of experts to manage a technology.
• “Who Secures?”: Both groups questioned the extent to which
technology could provide security in this setting. Both groups
concluded that the technological responses were only a part of
any answer to this question, and that social interaction plays an
equally important and necessary securing function. This theme
sheds further light on why “workarounds” might appear in order to
mitigate deficits in security technology capabilities, and highlights
the importance of social interaction and relational services in
securing these contexts.
• Benefits and Disbenefits: Both groups identified that establishing,
agreeing and communicating the benefits of IoT monitoring were
important processes to establish the relevant security goals. It
is through these interactions, some of which take the form of
relational services, that alternative conceptualisations of security
are both identified and reconciled.
The secondary analysis performed through Smith’s four critical secu-
rity questions (Smith, 2005) revealed di erent referent objects in each
study: the security practitioners focused on threats to the organisation
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and threats to themselves, whereas the healthcare service providers
focused on threats to the individual using the IoT monitoring device and
threats to the community of device users. The analysis performed using
these four questions also revealed a di erence in opinion as to who or
what was doing the securing. Whilst the security practitioners focused
on technology as doing the securing (whilst recognising the limitations),
the healthcare service providers focused on trust-led collective and social
action as the primary means of securing the use of IoT monitoring.
7.3.3 Reflections
Technological controls have limited power
Each group of practitioners viewed the security issues in di erent ways.
The security practitioners largely saw the environment as being too
complex for the security technologies to defend, whereas the healthcare
service providers saw the issues more as a lack of transparency and
accountability resulting from the complexity of the environment. In
response to this, the healthcare service providers argued for a multi-
stakeholder response in order to make the information flows from the
IoT devices more legible to those being monitored and to those doing
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the monitoring.
Both groups doubted the e ectiveness of technology to respond to
the issues that were thrown up and, in di erent ways. Both groups
indicated that technologies and practices that helped people to relate
the technology use to their practices and tasks would increase the trust
in the way information was being produced and circulated. This in turn
would help the identification of risks because it would be clearer which
aspects of the technology they could rely on. Both groups recognised that
the IoT monitoring technologies could both benefit and harm people
in the workplace and that there needs to be debate and agreement to
decide how these technologies are being used.
This case study shows the limitations of a solely technological ap-
proach to security. The response from the healthcare professionals
focuses on a dialogic, multi-stakeholder, trust-led approach. This repre-
sents an emphasis on the securing processes and seeks to build consensus
on the purpose of IoT monitoring and the parts each person plays to
achieve that agreed outcome. In order to cope with the ambiguity of
the IoT monitoring technology, both groups agreed that there needs to
be debate and discussion. This again throws a spotlight on the securing
processes.
7.4 Digital Security as a Practice
Resonate, resolve, reciprocate
Each of the three case studies
show the importance of a people-
centred, issues-driven approach that
mobilises sociotechnical security re-
sponses. Each case study also throws
light on one more intersections be-
tween technological security and an-
other security. By setting out the
wider security landscape, it becomes
possible to simultaneously see the
social and political security logics at
work, how the technological security interacts with this logic, and the
information sharing and protection practices that emerge as a result of
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this interaction.
These case studies show that a digital security practice can be charac-
terised with the following three principles: resonate, resolve, reciprocate.
The principles are set out in the table below and each promote a more
inclusive form of security. The principles are a recognition of the fact
that we are mutually dependent on each other to protect our digital
interactions. They are also a recognition of the fact that security con-
trols that do not respond to the security issues that people experience
will not be engaged with and potentially will increase insecurities, not
decrease them.
Table 7.1: Digital security principles
Principle Explanation
Resonate
An approach that people recognise
as o ering security
Resolve
An approach that resolves or re-
duces security issues
Reciprocate
An approach where the security of
one party also improves the security
of another
The principles in Table 7.1 play out in the three case studies in this
chapter as follows:
In Digital Security and Service Design we see the value of partic-
ipatory consultation when designing a service and the importance of
identifying security issues that resonate with the intended audience
of the service. We can also see that many of the security issues that
are identified sit at the intersection between technological security and
other forms of security. Therefore to resolve these issues requires that
the technological security is part of a wider sociotechnical network of
relational support. The security in this network is intended to reciprocate
where both service providers and the intended user communities work
together to identify and resolve issues for the protection of each other.
By contrast, the Digital Security for All study shows how both
insecurities increase and resistance to security controls emerges when
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the approach to technological security does not resonate with or resolve
the security issues of the service user. This case study also illustrates
what happens when the wider social and political security logic is not
felt to be reciprocal and that security is felt to be one-way (towards the
service provider) and hostile towards the individual.
Finally, Digital Security and Professional Security Practice illus-
trates the limitations of technological security to resolve human security
issues that arise from technology use. It also demonstrates how an
issues-led inclusive approach that uses collaboration and a strong so-
ciotechnical network to co-produce this response results in responses
that are more likely to resonate and resolve the security issues that
people experience from IoT monitoring technologies.
7.5 Concluding Comments
The three case studies demonstrate the significance of the original
VOME insights:
• assessing risk to digitally-mediated networked interactions re-
quires both the assessment of risks to technology and of the risks
networked technology use pose to the users of that technology;
• the understanding of technological security risk needs to be set
in the context of the wider concerns that networked technology
users are experiencing;
• people often focus on the benefits that they gain from using a
technology or service and consider the technological security risks
in relation to that benefit.
Using approaches that illuminated not only the technologies but the peo-
ple using those technologies and spaces in and around those interactions,
the case studies identify where:
• interventions and responses might be made in the spaces around
the human computer interaction;
• security technologies create rather than resolve threats to human
computer interaction.
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In the final chapter, a call to action is set out that is intended to move
forward digital security from being a series of case studies to being an
area of study and practice in its own right.
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Conclusions and Call to Action
Digital security acknowledges the importance of technological security
and the security of human computer interactions, but it sets those forms
of security into a security paradigm that places digital products and its
security in the wider social, cultural, economic and political setting.
In this monograph, digital security has been set out as:
• A paradigm that connects technological protection to the wider
social and political security logics.
• A paradigm that focuses on the practices that form in and around
digital products and their security technologies.
• A paradigm that produces understandings about particular pat-
terns of security responses to security technologies and policies.
This wider security perspective is needed in order to build meaningful
forms of digital protection because technological security has become
one of the main seams through which the security interests of the state
and other institutions of power come into direct conversation with
the security of the individual. On the one hand, technological security
is turned towards the task of ensuring that data and technology are
132
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reliable and stable in our digital products and services. On the other
hand, technological security signifies the values of the institutions that
deploy the technologies and enforce their logic of security which, in
turn, interacts with the security of the individual. It is an inescapable
fact that technological security is embedded in the social and political
security conversations about which values to protect and why (but
also which values to not protect). Digital security acknowledges the
importance of such conversations and recognises the social impacts
security technologies might have.
Digital technology has transformed society and changed the lived
experience of the majority. As a result, our relationships with the world,
with each other and with ourselves have been transformed through
digital products and services. Productivity and e ciency and how
we can do more, create more and produce more with ever scarcer
resources have been the dominant narratives that have driven this digital
transformation. Technological security has been put at the forefront of
our digitalised approach to regulating access to resources, controlling
access to processes of production, and determining who gets access to
what is produced and when.
In this drive to get more from less, it has been taken for granted
that the trust relations that bind society together will scale up to keep
pace with our digital expansion. When computer and network security
was first designed, it was not the intention that the principles used
to protect data and technology would become the principles used to
build and maintain trust relations between people. We contend that
technological security cannot do this alone and needs to be placed into
a broader form of digital security to be e ective in this front-line role.
Such a security places the security of technology in the context of the
security of people living day-to-day in a web-enabled and digitally-
connected society. It is a digital security that is su ciently flexible to
respond to the security tensions between stakeholders. Using a trust-led,
relational approach to identifying and responding to those tensions
means a broader, more inclusive digital security emerges; one in which
traditional forms of technological security are embedded into forms of
narrative and contextual security that both enable people to live free
from fear and protected from harms.
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Technological security is located within a broader digital security
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8.1 Call for Recognition and Action
This monograph concludes with a call to recognise both the political
and social power of security technologies and reflect this recognition in
the claims made about the e ectiveness of security technologies. We
therefore call for the recognition of:
• The social and political forms of security that security technologies
represent, and the ways that these forms shape the e ects that
security technologies have on individuals, groups and society.
• The ways in which digital exclusion takes many forms and has
the potential to harm not only those who are excluded but society
as a whole.
Once this is recognised, we call on those practising and researching
forms of digital security to take the following actions:
• Identify the security concerns of all stakeholders in a given sit-
uation and critically examine the power relations and political
imperatives that give rise to those concerns.
• Embrace and promote civic initiatives to develop di erent forms
of digital security and recognise the legitimacy of those approaches
in the ontology in which they have been designed.
• Promote and support a culture of respect for scholars and practi-
tioners who engage with di erent forms of digital security - the
validity of digital security should be determined by the e ects
it has and the contribution it makes to scholarship, not by the
ontological tradition that it stems from.
Security scholars and practitioners working with the digital stand at
a crossroads. We can either continue to place a focus on a security
paradigm that has protection shaped by a logic of exclusion and control
at its core or we can seek and acknowledge a form of security that puts
the responsibility to both protect and enable a secure society for all at
its core. If we continue to concentrate on a paradigm of security through
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exclusion and use this paradigm as the primary means of securing a
digitally-mediated society, we shall continue to contribute to cycles of
conflict and tension that are only set to increase as resources become
ever scarcer. If instead we place a focus on a paradigm of security
through inclusion that locates technological protection within a more
expansive and flexible logic of security, we can reshape our outlook and
in so doing contribute to a reformation of security norms and practices
that are grounded in principles of inclusion, trust and reciprocity.
Standing at a crossroads and the choice of direction is ours
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